SOCIAL IDENTITIES AND SOCIAL CONTEXT: SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND PERSONAL WELL-BEING

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ABSTRACT

In this chapter, we consider the fundamental importance of social identity both in terms of how people think about others and for personal well-being. The chapter reviews how social categorization and social identity impact people’s responses to others and, drawing on our own work on the Common Ingroup Identity Model, examines how identity processes can be shaped to improve intergroup relations. This model describes how factors that alter the perceptions of the memberships of separate groups to conceive of themselves as members of a single, more inclusive, superordinate group can reduce intergroup bias. The present chapter focuses on four developments in the model: (1) recognizing that multiple social identities can be activated simultaneously (e.g., a dual identity); (2) acknowledging that the meaning of different identities varies for different groups (e.g., racial or ethnic groups); (3) describing how the impact of different social identities can vary as a function of social context and social and personal values; and (4) outlining how these processes can influence not
only intergroup attitudes but also personal well-being, in terms of both mental and physical health.

Personal identity has long been identified within psychology as critical to an individual’s functioning, feelings of well-being, and actual accomplishment. Stage models of personal identity development, such as those of Freud, Erickson, and Maslow (Schultz & Schultz, 2001), have traditionally held a central place in personality and clinical psychology. However, more recently, social psychologists have also begun to recognize the significance for social behavior and intergroup relations of collective identities, such as those related to ethnic (Phinney, 2003) and racial group membership (Cross, 1991; Helms, 1990; Sellers, Rowley, Chavous, Shelton, & Smith, 1997) as well as to other important reference groups (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1991). Indeed, among the most significant developments in social psychology over the past 35 years has been the recognition that individuals have many different self-concepts and identities, rooted in personal experiences and aspirations (Markus & Nurius, 1986) and in the social groups to which they belong (Brewer, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

In this chapter, we consider the fundamental importance of social identity both in terms of how people think about others and for personal well-being. We begin by discussing the psychological foundation of social identity, the role of social categorization in human perception and action, and briefly review theories of social identity processes. Next, we examine how social identity impacts people’s responses to others and how identity processes can be shaped to improve intergroup relations. Our own program of research, guided by the Common Ingroup Identity Model, has focused on how factors that alter the perceptions of the memberships of separate groups to conceive of themselves as members of a single, more inclusive, superordinate group reduce intergroup bias and conflict. We then explore how the simultaneous activation of multiple identities, particularly the experience of a dual identity in which superordinate and subgroup identities are both salient, can in some cases produce more favorable intergroup responses and in other instances promote more negative reactions. We propose a framework to help understand and conceptually integrate these seemingly contradictory findings. Finally, we consider outcomes beyond intergroup attitudes, such as psychological and physical well-being, that may be significantly influenced by these social identity processes.

We begin our discussion by examining one of the fundamental processes underlying group identification effects, the social categorization process.
SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION

Social categorization forms an essential basis for human perception, cognition, and functioning. Because of the adaptive significance of intellect in human survival, people have a fundamental need to understand their environment. To cope with the enormous complexity of the world, people abstract meaning from their perceptions and develop heuristics and other simplifying principles for thinking about important elements in their environment. Categorization is one of the most basic processes in the abstraction of meaning from complex environments.

Categorization enables people to make decisions quickly about incoming information. The instant an object is categorized, it is assigned the properties shared by other category members (Biemat & Dovidio, 2000). Time-consuming consideration of each new experience is forfeited because it is usually wasteful and unnecessary. Categorization often occurs spontaneously on the basis of physical similarity, proximity, or shared fate. In this respect, people may be characterized as “cognitive misers” who compromise total accuracy for efficiency (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).

When people or objects are categorized into groups, actual differences between members of the same category tend to be perceptually minimized (Tajfel, 1969) and often ignored in making decisions or forming impressions. Members of the same category appear to be more similar than they actually are, and more similar than they were before they were categorized together. In addition, although members of a social category may be different in some ways from members of other categories, these differences tend to become exaggerated and overgeneralized. Thus, categorization enhances perceptions of similarities within groups and differences between groups - emphasizing social difference and group distinctiveness.

Because humans are social animals, relying on select others for interdependent activity and cooperation can have important short- and long-term consequences for individuals’ fitness and survival. Group membership is a key element in the maintenance of social bonds. Psychologically, expectations of cooperation and security promote positive attraction toward other ingroup members and motivate adherence to ingroup norms that assure that one will be recognized as a good or legitimate ingroup member. In this context, group identity becomes essential to a secure self-concept. Once group identification has been established, maintaining a sense of inclusion and cohesiveness becomes tantamount to protecting one’s own existence. Within this context, culture serves to regulate social behavior both within and between groups so as to maintain group cohesion and boundaries. The
reciprocal relationship between group identification and group culture makes intragroup coordination, trust, and cooperation possible. These same processes, however, can also give rise to intergroup differences and distrust that may seed and sustain conflict.

A universal perceptual process that is essential for efficient functioning is the ability to sort people, spontaneously and with minimum effort or awareness, into a smaller number of meaningful categories, social groups (Brewer, 1988; see also Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999). In the process of categorizing people into groups, people commonly classify themselves into one social category and out of others. Because of the centrality of the self in social perception (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993), social categorization fundamentally involves a distinction between the group containing the self (the ingroup) and other groups (the outgroups) – between the “we’s” and the “they’s.”

This distinction can have a profound influence on evaluations, cognitions, and behavior. The insertion of the self into the social categorization process increases the emotional significance of group differences and thus leads to further perceptual distortion and to evaluative biases that reflect favorably on the ingroup (Sumner, 1906), and consequently, on the self (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Perhaps one reason why ethnocentrism is so prevalent is because these biases operate even when the basis for the categorization is quite trivial, such as when group membership is assigned randomly (Billig & Tajfel, 1973). In the following section, we review two influential theories of group identity: social identity theory and self-categorization theory.

THEORIES OF SOCIAL IDENTITY

The essentially automatic process of distinguishing the group containing the self, the ingroup, from other groups, the outgroups (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993), represents a foundational principle in some of the most prominent contemporary theories of intergroup behavior, such as social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).

In social identity theory, Tajfel and Turner (1979) proposed that a person's need for positive self-identity can be satisfied by membership in prestigious social groups. This need motivates social comparisons that favorably differentiate ingroup from outgroup members. This perspective also posits that a person defines the self in one of two ways, as a unique individual with distinct characteristics and personal motives, or as the embodiment of a social college.

On a more fundamental level, one's own social identity and the collective identity are aspects of one's own self. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) posits that a person's self is intertwined with the collective identity, so that, when this collective identity is threatened, it is not simply lost but internalized, and a person's self-definition is affected accordingly. However, when social identity theory is extended to a more salient, individualized group level, individuals' perceptions of a group's social identity standards predict whether a particular event or situation shapes how people view the ingroup and the outgroup.

These theoretical perspectives are complementary and can be viewed as forming a cohesive whole. Both theories emphasize the role of social identity in shaping perceptions and behavior. For example, in the context of intergroup competition, the effect of perceived ingroup superiority on ingroup favoritism may be moderated by the individual's ingroup identity. In group contexts, individuals may use social identity to differentiate between ingroup and outgroup members. This differentiation can lead to outgroup derogation, which in turn can influence intergroup attitudes and behaviors. The social identity perspective provides a framework for understanding how individuals form and maintain their social identities, which in turn shapes their attitudes and behaviors in social contexts.
social collective, reflecting shared characteristics and goals. At the individual level, one's personal welfare and goals are most salient and important. At the collective level, the goals and achievements of the group are merged with one's own, and the group's welfare is paramount. At the level of personal identity, self-interest is represented by the pronoun "I"; at the level of social identity, it is represented by "We." Intergroup relations begin when people in different groups think about themselves as group members rather than as distinct individuals.

Though similar to social identity theory, self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) places greater emphasis on the cognitive processes involved in identification and can be considered a more general theory of inter- and intra-group processes. Self-categorization theory also makes a fundamental distinction between personal and collective identity, though these are seen more as different levels on a continuum rather than as qualitatively distinct and mutually exclusive states. When personal identity is more salient, an individual's needs, standards, beliefs, and motives better predict behavior. In contrast, when social identity is more strongly activated, "people come to perceive themselves more as interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities defined by their individual differences from others" (Turner et al., 1987, p. 50). Under these conditions, collective needs, goals, and standards are primary. For example, Verkuyten and Hagendoorn (1998) found that when individual identity was made salient, individual differences in authoritarianism were the major predictor of prejudice of Dutch students toward Turkish migrants. In contrast, when social identity (i.e., national identity) was primed, ingroup stereotypes and standards primarily predicted attitudes toward Turkish migrants. Thus, whether a person's personal or collective identity is more salient critically shapes how a person perceives, interprets, evaluates, and responds to situations and to others.

These theories of collective identity do not challenge the validity of instrumental theories of behavior, in which individual and group behavior are viewed as functional for obtaining resources and protecting self- and group interest. Both traditional and contemporary research demonstrates the profound functional advantages of ingroup solidarity and intergroup bias. For example, consistent with realistic conflict theory (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998), the classic Robber's Cave study (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) illustrated how competition between groups produces prejudice and discrimination. In contrast, intergroup interdependence and cooperative interaction that result in successful outcomes reduce intergroup bias. Nevertheless, social identity
theory and self-categorization theory emphasize how identification as a member of a social group is sufficient to shape how people respond to others and influence how people perceive themselves.

In the next section of the chapter we consider the ways, in which the recognition of group identity can have a critical impact on how people respond to others and can form the social psychological foundation for prejudice and intergroup bias.

**SOCIAL IDENTITY AND RESPONSES TO OTHERS**

Viewing oneself as a member of a social group and others as members of other groups has immediate consequences for how people perceive, think about, feel, and act toward others. As we noted earlier, categorization leads people to emphasize similarities within groups and differences between groups in their perceptions and cognitions. For social groups, this process is particularly important because social groupings are often assumed to represent natural categories, categories in which membership is determined by some aspect of the member's nature (Yzerbyt, Corneille, & Estrada, 2001). Membership in natural categories is often believed to reflect similarities in the essence of group members, and, thus, people are especially likely to generalize characteristics across members (producing strong stereotypes) and to generalize beyond the characteristic that originally differentiated the categories to additional dimensions and traits. As the salience of the social categorization increases, the magnitude of these distortions also tends to increase (Abrams, 1985; Turner, 1985).

Not only does social categorization activate perceptual and cognitive processes that emphasize the differences between ingroup and outgroup members, it also systematically biases the affective and evaluative associations with these groups. People spontaneously experience more positive affect toward other members of the group with which they identify, particularly toward those who are most prototypical of their group (Hogg & Hains, 1996), than toward members of other groups (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000). In addition, cognitive biases emerge in which people retain more information in a more detailed fashion for ingroup members than for outgroup members (Park & Rothbart, 1982), have better memory for information about ways in which ingroup members are similar to (and outgroup members dissimilar to) the self (Wilders, 1981), and remember less positive information about outgroup members (Howard & Rothbart, 1980). These affective and cognitive biases have important behavioral implications.

People are more highly ingroup (Dovidio et al., 1995; Worcel, Rothermund, & Stephan, 2000) and outgroup more greedy and less, if they react to each other.

Moreover, the extent to which intergroup bias the group favoritism and outgroup identification can, these components, relates to more positively about their own groups (Mummendey, group identification and intergroup relations).

Similarly, social identity one identifies and contextually responds. People possess multiple social categories and expectations, at the level of category (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Categorizations are formed in the way people think and to some extent, about the...
People are more helpful toward ingroup than toward outgroup members (Dovidio et al., 1997) and work harder for groups identified as ingroups (Worchel, Rothgerber, Day, Hart, & Butemeyer, 1998). In addition, when ingroup–outgroup social categorization is salient, people tend to behave in a more greedy and less trustworthy way toward members of other groups than if they react to each other as individuals (Insko et al., 2001).

Moreover, the extent to which people identify with their ingroup typically (albeit not universally; see Brown & Zafeska, 2005) moderates the level of intergroup bias they exhibit. Bias consists of the separate elements of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (Brewer, 1999), and ingroup identification can, under different circumstances, influence one or both of these components. Although stronger ingroup identification generally relates to more positive feelings and beliefs about the ingroup and its members, it predicts prejudice against outgroups primarily when people think about their group in relation to, and particularly in contrast to, the other group (Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001). Thus, the relationship of ingroup identification to intergroup bias depends on the context in which intergroup relations are observed.

Similarly, social identification, in terms of the particular group with which one identifies and the degree to which one identifies with the group, is contextually responsive. Social categories are not completely unalterable. People possess multiple social identities (Brewer, 2001), and the relevant social categories are often hierarchically organized, with higher-level categories (e.g., nations) more inclusive of lower level ones (e.g., cities or towns). By modifying a perceivers goals, motives, perceptions of past experiences, and expectations, as well as factors in the immediate context, one can alter the level of category inclusiveness that is most influential in a given situation (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This malleability in the level at which impressions are formed is important in terms of its implications for altering the way people think about members of ingroups and outgroups, and, consequently, about the nature of intergroup relations.

**SOCIAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS**

Because identification with social groups is a basic process that is fundamental to intergroup bias, social psychologists have targeted this process as a starting point for improving intergroup relations. A variety of different approaches have been employed successfully. For example, decategorization strategies that emphasize the individual qualities of others (Wilder, 1981) or
encourage personalized interactions (Miller, 2002) have been used to decrease the salience of social identities. The mutual intergroup differentiation approach, in contrast, attempts to keep group identities salient but to change the perceived relation between groups from competitive to cooperative (Hewstone & Brown, 1986; see also Brown & Hewstone, 2005).

The approach we have employed, the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), draws on the theoretical foundations of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987). This strategy emphasizes the process of recategorization, whereby members of different groups are induced to conceive of themselves as a single, more inclusive superordinate group rather than as two completely separate groups. As a consequence, attitudes toward former outgroup members become more positive through processes involving proingroup bias.

The Common Ingroup Identity Model identifies potential antecedents and outcomes of recategorization, as well as mediating processes. Fig. 1 summarizes the general framework and specifies the causes and consequences of a common ingroup identity. Specifically, we hypothesize that different types of intergroup interdependence and cognitive, perceptual, linguistic, affective, and environmental factors, can, either independently or in concert, alter individuals’ cognitive representations of the aggregate. For example, a common ingroup identity can be achieved by increasing the salience of existing common superordinate memberships (e.g., a school, a company, a nation, etc.) or by introducing factors (e.g., common goals or fate) perceived to be shared by these memberships. The resulting cognitive representations (i.e., one group, two subgroups within one group, two groups, or separate individuals) are then hypothesized to have specific cognitive, affective and overt behavioral consequences. Thus, the antecedent factors are proposed to influence members’ cognitive representations of the memberships that, in turn, mediate the relationship, at least in part, between the antecedent factors and the cognitive, affective, and behavioral consequences.

Decategorization and recategorization strategies were directly examined and contrasted in a laboratory study of intergroup bias (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989). In this experiment, members of two separate laboratory-formed groups were induced through various structural interventions (e.g., seating arrangement) either to decategorize themselves (i.e., conceive of themselves as separate individuals) or to recategorize themselves as a superordinate group. Consistent with the notion that altering the level of category inclusiveness can have a positive impact on intergroup
evaluations, the changes in the perceptions of intergroup boundaries reduced intergroup bias. Furthermore, as expected, these strategies reduced bias in different ways. Decategorizing members of the two groups reduced bias by decreasing the attractiveness of former ingroup members. In contrast, recategorizing ingroup and outgroup members as members of a more inclusive group reduced bias by increasing the attractiveness of the former outgroup members. Consistent with self-categorization theory, “the attractiveness of an individual is not constant, but varies with the ingroup membership” (Turner, 1985, p. 60).

Considerable empirical support has been obtained for the Common Ingroup Identity Model. In particular, people who identify more strongly with a superordinate group have more favorable attitudes toward those formerly seen as members of other groups who have been recategorized within this superordinate group identity. This effect has been obtained in laboratory and field experiments involving temporary and enduring groups, in cross-sectional and longitudinal field studies of the relations between racial and ethnic groups in high schools and colleges, in research on the responses of executives who recently experienced a corporate merger, in longitudinal studies of blended families, and as a consequence of programmatic anti-bias interventions with elementary school students (Banker, et al., 2004; Gaertner, Bachman, Dovidio, & Banker, 2001; Houlette et al., 2004). In addition, emphasizing a common group identity between two groups
facilitates forgiveness by members of the victimized group for historical transgressions by the other group and promotes intergroup trust (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). Moreover, the different strategies that have been used (e.g., decategorization, mutual intergroup differentiation, and recategorization) can operate sequentially over time and in complementary ways (Hewstone, 1996; Pettigrew, 1998). For example, creating a common ingroup identity facilitates more intimate self-disclosure (Dovidio et al., 1997), which in turn can produce more personalized interactions that can further reduce intergroup bias.

Despite the evidence for the effectiveness of achieving a common group identity for improving intergroup relations, it is often difficult to sustain a superordinate group identity in the face of powerful social forces within naturalistic settings that emphasize group differences and reinforce separate group memberships. Hewstone (1996) has argued that, at a practical level, interventions designed to create a common, inclusive identity (such as equal status contact) may not be sufficiently potent to “overcome powerful ethnic and racial categorizations on more than a temporary basis” (p. 351). With respect to the perception of others, when the basis for group membership is highly salient (e.g., physical features) and the social category is culturally important, the impact of interventions that temporarily induce feelings of common identity may quickly fade as the original category membership becomes repeatedly, and often automatically (as with race in the US; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993) activated. With respect to the experience of one’s own social identity, when group identities and their associated cultural values are vital to one’s functioning it would be undesirable or impossible for people to relinquish this aspect of their self-concept completely. Indeed, demands to abandon these group identities or to adopt a colorblind ideology would likely arouse strong reactance and result in especially poor intergroup relations.

It is therefore important for practical as well as theoretical reasons to consider more complex forms of social identity, in which more than one identity is salient at a time. Within the context of the Common Ingroup Identity Model, however, the development of a common ingroup identity need not require each group to forsake its less inclusive group identity. In particular, the most recent developments in our work on the Common Ingroup Identity Model have focused on a second form of recategorization, the impact of a dual identity, in which the superordinate identity is salient but in conjunction with a salient subgroup identity (a “different groups working together on the same team” representation). In this respect, the Common Ingroup Identity Model is aligned with bidimensional models of acculturation, in that it assumes that cultural identity is not necessarily independent of group membership. Instead, it posits that cultural identity is determined in part by the Common Ingroup Identity Model.

Because individuals who possess multiple identities often employ a strategy characterized by intergroup bias (Branscombe et al., 1999), this approach establishes boundary maintenance. A boundary that is an ingroup ingroup intervention thus preserves the degree to which both subgroup members are ingroup members of the other, while reducing biases to the simple group category and broad range of situations. Crossed categorization can reduce biases to the simple group category and broad range of situations.

The dual identity perspective on which the original superordinate group identity model is based on establishing a congruence of subgroup identities, and permits the benefits of ingroup identity without arousing counterproductive negative reactions. By allowing ingroup identification of both groups, the benefit of ingroup identity is retained without the negative counterproductive reactions.

In his classic book, “The White Man’s Burden” (1930), whereas Whites attributed their exceptional consciousness be...
acculturation, in which cultural heritage and mainstream identities are relatively independent (Berry, 1997), not with unidimensional models, which posit that cultural identity is necessarily relinquished with adoption of mainstream cultural identity (Gans, 1979). We consider this development in the Common Ingroup Identity Model in the next section.

DUAL IDENTITY

Because individuals frequently belong to several groups simultaneously and possess multiple potential identities, it is possible to activate or introduce a shared identity even while separate group identities are salient. Such a strategy characterizes the crossed categorization approach for reducing intergroup bias (Brewer, Ho, Lee, & Miller, 1987; Deschamps & Doise, 1978). In this approach, group boundaries are restructured such that the newly established boundaries crosscut the original group boundaries, redefining who is an ingroup member and who is an outgroup member. This type of intervention thus changes the pattern of who is “in” and who is “out,” or the degree to which participants are ingroup or outgroup members when both subgroup categories are considered simultaneously. That is, some members are ingroup members on one dimension but outgroup members on the other, while others are ingroup or outgroup members on both dimensions. Crossed categorization strategies have proven to be effective at reducing biases toward members of other groups, relative to the original simple group categorization (Mullen, Migidal, & Hewstone, 2001), across a broad range of situations (Crisp, Ensari, Hewstone, & Miller, 2003).

The dual identity approach is a particular form of crossed categorization, in which the original group boundaries are maintained but within a salient superordinate group identity that represents a higher level of inclusiveness. Establishing a common superordinate identity while maintaining the salience of subgroup identities may be effective in reducing bias because it permits the benefits of a common ingroup identity to operate without arousing countervailing motivations to achieve positive intergroup distinctiveness. Moreover, this type of recategorization may be particularly effective when people have strong allegiances to their original groups. In this respect, the benefits of a dual identity may be especially relevant to intercultural and interethnic group contexts.

In his classic book, *The souls of Black folk*, DuBois (1938) observed that whereas Whites form a relatively simple and direct form of social consciousness because White culture and dominant American culture are
synonymous, Black Americans develop a dual form of consciousness, in which they are sensitive to the values and expectations of the majority culture while also aware of and responsive to the values and expectations of Black culture. In our terms, whereas Whites may generally assume a single identity, in which White and American identity correspond, minority group members may generally form a dual identity, in which the American superordinate and the racial or ethnic subgroup identity are distinct. Empirical research, 60 years later, supports DuBois’ observation: White identity is much more closely aligned with a superordinate American identity than is Black identity (Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997). However, whereas DuBois argued that “double-consciousness” was debilitating, contemporary research suggests that, under certain conditions, it can be adaptive and constructive.

Berry (1984) offered a framework to help understand the different types of consciousness and identity processes that immigrant groups can experience within the dominant culture of the host society. Specifically, Berry (1984) presented four forms of cultural relations in pluralistic societies that represent the intersection of “yes – no” responses to two fundamental questions: (1) Are the original cultural identity and customs of value to be retained? and (2) Are positive relations with the larger society of value, and to be sought? These combinations reflect four adaptation strategies, identified by Berry, for intergroup relations: (1) integration, when cultural identities are retained and positive relations with the larger society are sought; (2) separatism, when original cultural identities are retained but positive relations with the larger society are not sought; (3) assimilation, when cultural identities are abandoned and positive relations with the larger society are desired; and (4) marginalization, when cultural identities are abandoned and are not replaced by positive identification with the larger society.

Although this framework was originally applied to the ways in which immigrants acclimate to a new society (van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998), we have adapted it to apply to intergroup relations between majority and minority groups more generally (see Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kafati, 2000). Substituting the separate strengths of the subgroup and subordinate group identities for the answers to Berry’s (1984) two questions, the combinations map onto the four main representations considered in the Common Ingroup Identity Model: (1) dual identity (subgroup and superordinate group identities are high, such as feeling like different groups on the same team: which relates to Berry’s adaptation strategy of integration); (2) different groups (subgroup identity is high and superordinate identity is low: separatism); (3) one group (subgroup identity is low and superordinate group identity (subgroup and superordinate identity: which relates to Berry’s adaptation strategy of assimilation); Within our conception of dual identity or categorization on different groups others as separate categorization.

Consistent with recategorization by group members, the racial or ethnic identity of a superordinate authority within a setting of students in a majority, and as a member of other groups in the terms of their superordinate, the simultaneous with lower levels.

Although these are alternatives to attitudes and the beneficial caution that the effects generated by the nature of significant effect for ethnic high school students experienced a corrosive effect, the experience of inner-group effects across intergroup identity was related to the corporate model (see Gaertner et al. 2000).

One potential benefit identity is the “cultural self may relate to positive superordinate identity, itself, representations or as an intermediate...
group identity is high: assimilation); and (4) separate individuals (subgroup and superordinate group identities are low relative to individual identity: which relates to Berry's adaptation strategy of marginalization). Within our conceptualization, the processes involved in the formation of a dual identity or one group identity represent recategorization, an emphasis on different group memberships reflects separatism, and perceptions of others as separate individuals rather than as group members represents decategorization.

Consistent with our hypothesis that a dual identity represents a form of recategorization that can facilitate positive intergroup relations for minority group members, Huo, Smith, Tyler, and Lind (1996) found that even when racial or ethnic identity is strong for minority group members, perceptions of a superordinate connection enhance interracial trust and acceptance of authority within an organization. We found converging evidence in a study of students in a multiethnic high school (Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1996). Students who described themselves as both American and as a member of their racial or ethnic group showed less bias toward other groups in the school than did those who described themselves only in terms of their subgroup identity. Thus, even when subgroup identity is salient, the simultaneous salience of a common ingroup identity is associated with lower levels of intergroup bias.

Although these findings support the value of developing a dual identity as an alternative to a one-group representation for improving intergroup attitudes and the behavioral orientations of minority group members, we caution that the effectiveness of a dual identity may be substantially moderated by the nature of the intergroup context. In contrast to the consistent, significant effect for the one-group representation across studies of a multiethnic high school (Gaertner et al., 1996), for banking executives who experienced a corporate merger and for stepfamilies (Gaertner et al., 2001), the experience of a dual identity functioned differently, producing different effects across intergroup settings. In particular, a stronger sense of dual identity was related to less bias in the high school study but to more bias in the corporate merger study and more conflict within the stepfamily study (see Gaertner et al., 2001).

One potential factor that might moderate the effectiveness of a dual identity is the "cultural ideal" of the social entity. That is, a dual identity may relate to positive attitudes toward members of other groups within the superordinate identity as well as to indicators of well-being when a dual identity, itself, represents a cultural ideal, as with a pluralistic social value, or as an intermediate stage in movement from separatism to primarily a
one-group, superordinate identity (i.e., assimilation). In a national probability sample of Latinos, for example, de la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia (1996) found that ethnic identity was not perceived as competing with an American identity. In fact stronger ethnic identity was related to more positive attitudes toward other groups and personal adjustment because, as the researchers found, “ethnics use ethnicity to create resources such as group solidarity and political organizations to facilitate their full participation in American society” (p. 337).

In contrast, when the simultaneous activation of subgroup and superordinate group identities is inconsistent with the dominant cultural value (e.g., assimilation) or is perceived to reflect movement away from that cultural value, a dual identity is hypothesized to be negatively related to intergroup attitudes and to feelings of well-being. Our previous findings can be interpreted as consistent with this proposition. Within the context of a corporate merger, in which maintaining strong identification with the subgroup might threaten the primary goal of the merger, and within the context of a blended family, in which bias toward one’s former family can be diagnostic of serious problems, a one-group representation would be expected to be – and is – the most important mediator of positive intergroup relations.

In general, then, we propose that the meaning, and thus the impact, of the experience of a dual identity are dynamically determined by the social context. Research on the self, for instance, has conceptualized self-esteem as an interpersonal monitor, a sociometer that “alerts the individual to the possibility of social exclusion” (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995, p. 518), and varies as a function of individual differences in personal values and priorities (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). We hypothesize that cognitive representations of groups (and particularly a dual identity) operate in an analogous way at the collective level. That is, a dual identity can reflect the degree of social inclusion or exclusion of one’s group, and thus its meaning can vary as a function of the dominant social values in the context as well as a function of one’s motivations, priorities, and perspectives. When the dominant value in a given context is assimilationist (i.e., one group) or if an individual has assimilation as a personal goal, a dual identity may reflect exclusion and be associated with negative attitudes toward other groups. In contrast, when the primary cultural, subcultural, or personal value is pluralistic and integrationist, a dual identity may be more strongly associated with positive intergroup attitudes and orientations. In the next section, we further explore the implications of this framework for understanding intergroup attitudes.
DUAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP ATTITUDES

Although achieving a common ingroup identity can have beneficial effects for both majority and minority group members, as our previous research has demonstrated, it is still important to recognize that members of these groups also have different perspectives (Islam & Hewstone, 1993). These different perspectives can shape perceptions of and reactions to the nature of the contact. Whereas minority group members often want to retain their cultural identity, majority group members tend to favor the assimilation of minority groups into one single culture (a traditional “melting pot” orientation) – a process that reaffirms and reinforces the values of the dominant culture. Van Oudenhoven et al. (1998), for instance, found in the Netherlands that Dutch majority group members preferred an assimilation of minority groups, in which minority group identity was abandoned and replaced by identification with the dominant Dutch culture, whereas Turkish and Moroccan immigrants most strongly endorsed integration, in which they would retain their own cultural identity while also valuing the dominant Dutch culture. These orientations, assimilation for the majority group and integration for minority groups, are stronger for majority and minority group members who identify more strongly with their group (Verkuyl & Brug, 2004). Within the US, Whites place primary value on assimilation, whereas minority most strongly value multicultural integration (Plaut & Markus, 2004). In terms of the Common Ingroup Identity Model, we have found that White college students value a one-group (assimilation) orientation most, whereas racial and ethnic minorities most favor a “same team” (pluralistic integration) representation (Dovidio et al., 2000).

One direct consequence of these different values is that attempts to induce or impose a common ingroup identity may be differentially successful for groups that already value a superordinate identity as compared to groups for which a one-group identity can threaten important subgroup identities. Under these conditions of identity threat, manipulations emphasizing common group identity can potentially exacerbate rather than reduce intergroup bias (Hewstone & Brown, 1986).

Furthermore, to the extent to which Whites hold assimilationist cultural values and Blacks possess pluralistic values, one-group and dual-identity representations would be expected to operate differently as mediators of the effect of intergroup contact on intergroup attitudes. Supportive of this hypothesis, we found that perceptions of favorable intergroup contact predicted more favorable intergroup attitudes for both White and minority college students, but they did so in different ways (Dovidio, Gaertner,
Hodson, Houlette, & Johnson, 2004; Dovidio et al., 2000). For White students, more favorable perceptions of intergroup contact predicted stronger one-group representations, which, in turn, primarily mediated more positive attitudes toward minorities. For minority students, it was the strength of the dual identity, not the one-group representation that mediated the relationship between favorable conditions of contact and positive attitudes toward Whites. Parallelizing the results of Verkuyten and Brug (2004) who found differences in preference for assimilation and integration by majority and minority group members as a function of group identification in the Netherlands, these relationships that we found were stronger for majority and minority group members who identified more strongly with their racial group.

Complementing these findings for White students and students of color, we have also found that, within a sample of predominantly White students, status moderates the relationship between a dual identity and bias (Johnson, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 2001). Among low and high status university students (i.e., regular students and students in the prestigious Honors Program, respectively), who were expected to perform the same tasks within a superordinate workgroup, the relationship between perceptions of the aggregate as two subgroups within a group (a dual identity) and bias depended upon the status of the group. For low status (regular) students, higher perceptions of a dual identity significantly predicted less bias, whereas for higher status (honors) students, a stronger dual identity predicted greater bias.

Intergroup relations, however, represent more than simply the attitudes of one group toward another; they reflect the fact that groups bring different values to their interactions and have different perspectives on their interactions (Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, & Hodson, 2002; Islam & Hewstone, 1993). As a consequence, the expression of an identity that is valued and functional for a member of one group (e.g., a dual identity for a minority group member) may unintentionally and without full awareness produce a negative reaction from a member of another group holding a different cultural value (e.g., a one-group, assimilationist value held by a majority group member). Piontkowski, Rohmann, and Florack (2002) found that discordance in acculturation values between majority and minority groups was directly related to feelings of intergroup threat. One manifestation of this threat may be negative intergroup attitudes. We illustrated this dynamic in another study.

In this experiment (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Johnson, 1999), White college students from Colgate University first read a campus newspaper article about a Black student. The student was either a superior or inferior student. After the information tape asked students to write a description of the student, a Common In-group Questionnaire was constructed. Colgate students are a unique group of students as a function of their interest in California and the Black student research that was occurring in the psychology department. Ss were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Complete In-group Identification (CIQ) or Partial In-group Identification (PIQ). The results showed that CIQ students, who were high in in-group identification, expressed less favorable attitudes toward Black students than PIQ students. This study, which was presented by Gaertner and colleagues at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, was designed to test whether in-group identification has an impact on intergroup attitudes. The results of this study indicate that in-group identification may play a role in determining whether intergroup attitudes are positive or negative. The findings of this study suggest that in-group identification may influence the development of intergroup attitudes. Further research is needed to determine the extent to which in-group identification influences intergroup attitudes.
about a Black student who had experienced a serious illness that had caused
the student academic difficulties and then viewed a videotape that portrayed
the student being interviewed about the situation. The presentation of the
Black student, a confederate, was designed to make a positive impression.
After the initial presentation of the confederate, an interviewer on the vid-
etape asked, “And how do you see yourself?” The confederate’s response
was constructed to reflect one of the four representations outlined in the
Common Ingroup Identity Model: (1) “I see myself primarily as a Colgate
student” (one group), (2) “I see myself primarily as a Black person” (dif-
ferent group), (3) “I see myself primarily as a Black Colgate student (or a
Colgate student who is Black)” (dual identity), or (4) “I see myself primarily
as a unique individual” (separate individuals). The outcome measure of
interest was the attitudes of White participants toward Blacks after observ-
ing the Black confederate.

The results of this study provide further evidence that the effectiveness of
a dual identity is critically moderated by the social context and cultural
values. In this case, the manipulation based on a one-group representation,
which was most compatible with an assimilationist ideology, was most ef-
fective in inducing more positive attitudes in White college students. Atti-
tudes toward Blacks in general were significantly less prejudiced and more
favorable when the Black student described himself or herself solely in terms
of common university membership than in the other three conditions. At-
titudes in the other three conditions – dual identity, different groups, and
separate individuals – did not differ from one another. Indeed, attitudes
toward Blacks tended to be the most negative when Black confederates
expressed a dual identity. Thus, understanding intergroup relations requires
a knowledge not only of the separate attitudes and values held by members
of different groups, but also an appreciation of the consequences of bringing
together people who hold different values and perspectives and who, thus,
may form different impressions of the same interaction (Dovidio et al.,
1999).

Increasing the salience of different cultural orientations can systematically
influence Whites’ responses to Blacks. Participants in a study by Wolsko,
Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink (2000) received a message advocating either a
colorblind (assimilationist) or multicultural (pluralistic) approach to im-
proving intergroup relations, making either of these social values salient.
Participants in a control condition did not receive such a message. Wolsko
et al. found that White participants who received the message advocating a
multicultural social value had more positive attitudes toward Blacks than
did White participants who received the message advocating a colorblind
social value. The responses of White participants in the control condition were closely aligned with those in the color-blind condition.

Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) suggest a specific mechanism, relative prototypicality, which may be involved in determining the relative effectiveness of interventions designed to produce one-group or dual identity representations. They propose that when a common, superordinate identity is salient, people tend to overestimate the extent to which their own groups’ norms, values, and standards are prototypical of the superordinate category relative to the extent to which other groups’ norms, values, and standards are prototypical. When the standards of one’s own group are perceived to represent those of the superordinate category, the standards of other groups may be seen as nonnormative and inferior. As a consequence, bias results. It is further possible that a salient subgroup identity, which can increase the strength of projection of beliefs, values, and norms (Mullen, Dovidio, Johnson, & Copper, 1992), can exacerbate the effects of relative prototypicality when the superordinate group identity is also salient. Thus, even though strong racial identities, alone or in the form of a dual identity, may be initially beneficial, particularly for minorities, the adoption of a single, inclusive identity might be the primary predictor of reductions in bias over time and across situations. This may be especially true within the context of organizations such as historically White colleges, in which assimilation is the traditional ideal.

Supportive of this reasoning, in a longitudinal study, we investigated the changes that occurred in the attitudes of minority college students over an academic year as a function of group representations (Dovidio et al., 2004). In particular, minority students were surveyed first at the beginning of the academic year and then again within 6 weeks before the end of the academic year. Students were asked about their perceptions of the favorability of intergroup contact on campus, their perceptions of racial and ethnic groups on campus (one group, different subgroups on the same team, different groups, and separate individuals), and their attitudes toward Whites on campus.

Perceptions of favorable intergroup contact at the beginning of the year predicted more favorable attitudes toward Whites initially and at the end of the year. In addition, although the dual identity (same team) representation was the primary predictor of positive attitudes toward Whites initially, it was the development of a stronger one-group representation, not a stronger dual identity, that predicted increases in favorable intergroup attitudes over the year. Across this same period, the minority students apparently recognized the dominant institutional value as a one-group representation, and,

thus, those who have more positive attitudes.

In summary, while the value of individuals in our relations, our members in a new identity, simultaneously is well. 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thus, those who showed greater correspondence with that value had more positive attitudes toward the majority group on campus, Whites.

In summary, whereas our earlier work on intergroup attitudes focused on the value of inducing a common ingroup identity for improving intergroup relations, our more recent work has recognized the importance of a dual identity, simultaneously salient subgroup and superordinate identities, as well. However, the effects for the dual identity representation may appear contradictory, sometimes relating positively and sometimes negatively to intergroup attitudes. We propose however that these seemingly contradictory findings can be reconciled by considering the meaning ascribed to a dual identity, in terms of its “fit” with one’s cultural values (e.g., colorblind or multicultural values) and its interpretation as movement toward or away from achieving these values.

IDENTITY AND WELL-BEING

Although the focus in our research on the Common Ingroup Identity Model has been on intergroup attitudes and relations, we believe that the experience of social identity can have far-reaching implications for the well-being of both minority and majority group members. That is, intergroup bias is hypothesized to be symptomatic of more fundamental conflicts and threats that can pervasively influence mental and physical health. To the extent that people identify with a social group, their self-concept will likely be shaped by how others think about, feel about, and treat their group. That is, self-concept develops not only from other people’s views of the self (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934) but also from others’ views of one’s social group (Allport, 1954/1979).

Because minority groups are often devalued and discriminated against by the majority group, greater identification with one’s minority ingroup might be expected to have adverse effects on mental and physical well-being. Allport (1954/1979), for example, remarked, “Ask yourself what would happen to your own personality if you heard it said over and over again that you were lazy, a simple child of nature, expected to steal, and had inferior blood?...One’s reputation, whether false or true, cannot be hammered, hammered, hammered, into one’s head without doing something to one’s character” (Allport, 1954/1979, p. 142).

Consistent with Allport’s speculation, current research on stereotype threat indicates that making one’s stigmatized identity salient can promote stereotype-confirming behaviors, even when a person does not endorse the
stereotype and the behaviors interfere with achieving desired goals (Steele, 1997). In addition, many stigmatized groups (e.g., White women, overweight people) have generally lower self-esteem than their nonstigmatized counterparts (see Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). Moreover, because stigmatization not only involves stereotyping and negative attitudes toward one's group but also negative treatment, perceptions of discrimination may produce chronically high levels of stress experienced by minority group members that can negatively impact (both directly and indirectly) mental and physical health (Jackson et al., 1996; Williams, Spencer, & Jackson, 1999). Blacks, for example, exhibit high levels of distrust toward Whites (Dovidio et al., 2002). For both Blacks and Latinos, perceptions of greater racial or ethnic discrimination predict poorer mental health (Stuber, Galea, Ahern, Blaney, & Fuller, 2003). In addition, among Blacks, Williams and Chung (2004) found that experiences of racial discrimination in the previous month were related to subsequently reported health problems. Experiences of racist events are also associated with behaviors that can have long-term adverse consequences for health, such as smoking and drinking, among Black women (Kwate, Valdimarsdottir, Guavarra, & Borbjerg, 2003).

Awareness of others' negative orientations toward one's group, however, does not always adversely affect members of stigmatized groups. Perceptions of bias sometimes result in enhanced performance, at least in the short term, as people work especially hard to compensate for the prejudice of others (Miller & Myers, 1998). In addition, inconsistent with Allport's suggestion, stigmatized groups do not necessarily exhibit lower self-esteem than nonstigmatized groups. Blacks, for example, show significantly higher levels of self-esteem than do Whites (Twenge & Crocker, 2000). Identification with one's group can act as a buffer to the negative attitudes toward, perceptions, and treatment of minority groups.

Prejudice provides an external attribution for negative outcomes, protecting the self-esteem of minority group members (Crocker & Major, 1989). Blacks higher in racial consciousness perceive external factors, such as discrimination against their group, as more influential for negative outcomes personally, as well as for other Blacks (Brown & Johnson, 1999). In addition, because being the target of prejudice produces stress, responses to the stigmatization of one's group can be conceptualized with frameworks of stress and coping (see Major et al., 2002, for a review). Thus, perceived discrimination may lead to stronger identification with one's group as a way to cope with the stress of being the target of prejudice (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Sanders Thompson, 1999). Greater identification with one's group, in turn, may buffer people against the potentially adverse consequences of prejudice (Dovidio & Shaw, 1998).

We acknowledge the effects of stigma; however, an approach to understanding and well-being that emphasizes group status and the strength of one's group, especially in the nature of racism, is critical. From this perspective, the phenomena of racial threat are often appreciated in the context of an often unpleasant and physically and psychologically oppressive history of racial discrimination. Many research studies have found greater perceived discrimination among members of an American minority culture (Glass & Nettleton, 1997).

To the extent that people who are faced with a group that is experienced as threatening may not feel Americans experience a sense of threat and the threat of mental and physical health problems may be in danger and consequently may feel more identity significance (Dovidio et al., 2002). The identification is seen as a way to cope with the stress of being the target of prejudice (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Sanders Thompson, 1999). Greater identification with one's group, in turn, may buffer people against the potentially adverse
consequences of perceived discrimination (Branscombe et al., 1999; Fischer & Shaw, 1999).

We acknowledge the validity of each of these various accounts for the effects of stigmatization on different groups, but we also propose that our approach to identity processes within the Common Ingroup Identity Model offers an additional intergroup perspective on the issue of stigmatization and well-being. In particular, much of the previous research on minority group status, group identity, and well-being has focused exclusively on the strength of people’s identification with their racial or ethnic group. Moreover, unidimensional models of acculturation emphasize the competitive nature of racial or ethnic and mainstream cultural identities (Gans, 1979). From this perspective, the effects of group identity and well-being would often appear contradictory. Many studies showed that stronger identification with one’s racial or ethnic subgroup is associated with greater mental and physical well-being (Branscombe et al., 1989; Miller, 1999), whereas other studies demonstrate that stronger mainstream identity is related to greater personal adjustment and better mental and physical health (Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000). Our work on intergroup relations demonstrates the importance of considering identification both with the subgroup (e.g., one’s racial and ethnic group) and the superordinate group (e.g., identity as an American), as well as the personal and cultural value of these different cultural representations.

To the extent that members of stigmatized groups identify only with a group that they perceive is marginalized or devalued and do not feel accepted as a member of the larger society, they are likely to experience higher levels of chronic stress and consequent impairment of mental and physical (Williams & Chung, 2004). Thus, minority group members who perceive subgroup identity and superordinate group identity to be in conflict (Ryder et al., 2000; Sidanius et al., 1997) and those who desire inclusion in the larger (American) society but who are excluded may have relatively high levels of stress and low levels of mental and physical well-being. That is, when a separate-group’s identity or a dual identity signals the exclusion of a minority group member from full participation in the larger society, minority group members are likely to experience elevated stress levels that can, over time, erode mental and physical health. Thus, our approach acknowledges that experiences of specific acts of discrimination adversely affect mental and physical health, but we further posit that general feelings of exclusion from the larger society represents the fundamental basis of pervasive stress and threat (see MacDonald & Leary, 2005).
Furthermore, from our perspective, although limiting identification to one’s racial or ethnic group (i.e., to the exclusion of a larger superordinate American identity) may have some immediate benefits, this can produce disidentification with the larger society that can have long-term detrimental effects. For Blacks, for example, this orientation can lead to lower academic aspiration and achievement (Osborne, 1997). With respect to health, Blacks who more strongly identify with their while rejecting White culture have higher blood pressure (Thompson, Kamarck, & Manuck, 2002) and a distrust that can produce an underutilization of medical, psychological, and social services (e.g., Thompson, Valdimarsdottir, Jandorf, & Redd, 2004).

In contrast, members of minority groups with a dual identity who identify with both their minority group and with the larger society and see these identities as complementary tend to be well-adjusted personally, experience lower levels of stress, and engage in more health-promotive activities (Airhihenbuwa, Kumanyika, TenHave, & Morssink, 2000). A review of the literature by LaFromboise, Coleman, and Gerton (1993) revealed that members of racial and ethnic minority groups who demonstrated stronger bicultural or multicultural identities had better social adjustment, psychological adaptation, and overall well-being. We have also found that minority college students who value and possess dual identities, reflecting identification with both their racial or ethnic group and the greater community, were more satisfied with their educational experience and more motivated to complete their college degree at their institution (Dovidio et al., 2000). Further analysis of that dataset revealed that a dual identity predicted lower feelings of threat and greater intergroup trust among minority students, over and above the effects of ethnic and racial group identification.

Our perspective also draws attention to the relationship between group identity and the mental and physical health of majority group members, something that receives less attention in models of coping with stigmatization. To the extent that identification with one’s group corresponds with the superordinate group identity (as with majority group members), individuals may be particularly likely to see their group’s attributes and perspectives as prototypical of the superordinate group values (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). These perceptions of the value of one’s group may eventually become internalized into one’s self-concept and reflected by high self-esteem (Leary, 1999) and feelings of self-efficacy (Bandura, 2000), which generally produce better psychological adjustment, higher personal expectations for success, greater resiliency to stressful events, and higher levels of actual accomplishment.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we have examined how social identity relates to intergroup biases and personal well-being in the context of the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). From this perspective, social categorization forms the foundation for social identity and, ultimately, how people respond to others, both to members of the ingroup (e.g., ingroup favoritism) and to members of outgroup (e.g., outgroup derogation). The earliest evidence for the model demonstrated that recategorizing others who were originally viewed in terms of their membership in another group as members of a common superordinate group can redirect the psychological forces of ingroup favoritism to improve attitudes toward these other people and reduce intergroup bias. The current chapter considers four fundamental extensions of the model.

First, in this chapter, we emphasized the importance of recognizing that people belong to many different groups, and these social identities can become activated simultaneously. Thus, to understand more fully the profound influence of social identities, research on intergroup relations and mental and physical well-being as a function of group membership needs to move beyond consideration of the effects of simple categorization to multiple categorization and identities.

Second, we have argued that the meaning of social identities can have different implications for members of different groups. Whereas assimilation is the preferred cultural model for majority group members, integration that values multicultural perspectives is the generally preferred cultural model minority group members. Within the framework of the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), we have found evidence in both laboratory experiments and field studies showing that majority group members prefer a one-group (assimilationist) model, have more positive attitudes toward other groups when then have this representation, and may be threatened by members of other groups who appear to value other representations more highly. Members of minority groups, in contrast, have more favorable attitudes toward Whites and have greater organizational commitment, at least initially, when they have a dual identity, reflecting identification with their racial or ethnic group and with a relevant superordinate group (e.g., a college or nation).

Third, we proposed that the meaning of social identities must be considered in a dynamic context, in relation to perceived social and cultural standards and personal values. For instance, Whites, who value a one-group, assimilationist orientation feel more threatened and have more
negative attitudes toward Blacks who emphasize their separate group identity or a dual identity than toward Blacks who emphasize only their common group membership (Dovidio et al., 1999). Also, when a separate-group’s identity or a dual identity signals the exclusion of a minority group member from full participation in the larger society, minority group members may respond with feelings of threat and negative attitudes toward the majority group. In contrast, when racial or ethnic and superordinate identities are perceived to be complementary and the combination is jointly valued, a dual identity predicts more positive intergroup attitudes. In general, the more concordant a person’s social identity is with what they perceive to be the dominant or desired cultural model (Berry, 1997), the more positive are their intergroup attitudes (Dovidio et al., 2004; see also Piontkowski et al., 2002).

Fourth, and finally, in the present chapter we consider the implications of the Common Ingroup Identity Model and its extensions beyond intergroup attitudes to issues of mental and physical well-being. That is, whereas our previous research has focused on the effects of different social identities and representations on intergroup attitudes, discrimination, and relations, we propose that these may be symptomatic of underlying feelings of threat and stress that can have a range of consequences for personal well-being, including mental and physical health. Thus, the study of social identities within the Common Ingroup Identity Model can help integrate previously separate literatures on the topics of prejudice, intergroup relations, acculturation, disparities in mental and physical health, and deviance and offer an intergroup perspective to complement models of personal identity development.

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