ON THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE: 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HATE

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Racial biases are a fundamental form of social control that support the economic, political, and personal goals of the majority group (Liska, 1997). Because of their functionality, racial biases are deeply embedded in cultural values, such as in widely accepted ideologies that justify inequality and exploitation and institutional policies and practices (Jones, 1997). Although the racial climate in the United States has changed because of shifts in social norms over the last several decades, racial biases may still be openly expressed by Whites who strongly adhere to traditional values and conventional beliefs (i.e., Whites high in authoritarianism; Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) or who see the superior status of Whites relative to Blacks as legitimate (i.e., Whites high in social dominance orientation; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Moreover, racial biases that are less overtly negative but still function to reduce threat and maintain

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the status quo that provides advantages to Whites are frequently manifested more subtly by many Whites who openly endorse egalitarian values and who believe they are nonprejudiced (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). The present chapter explores the nature of racial attitudes of White Americans toward Blacks and illustrates the traditional and contemporary role of the psychology of hate—its seeds and its open expression—in race relations.

Racism in the United States has historically manifested itself in a variety of ways, including slavery, segregation, open discrimination, and violent actions such as lynchings. Although adverse economic conditions (Hovland & Sears, 1940; cf. Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998) and the frustration of basic human needs (Staub, 1996), sparked by specific “trigger” incidents (Torres, 1999), have often instigated such brutal violent actions as lynchings and riots, a foundational, predisposing factor is racial prejudice.

Prejudice is commonly defined as an unfair negative attitude toward a social group or a person perceived to be a member of that group and, like other attitudes, consists of three components: affect, cognition, and behavior. The cognitive component involves specific thoughts or beliefs about the attitude object; the affective component involves feelings and emotions associated with the attitude object; and the behavioral component reflects associations with the person’s past or intended action toward the attitude object. The experience and intensity of the negative affect related to prejudice can vary as a function of the specific group and moderating situational conditions. The various emotional reactions involved in prejudice range from mild discomfort, disgust, and fear to anger and, at the extreme, open hatred, with the specific emotions involved corresponding to different patterns of behavioral responses to the other group (Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 2002).

Hate has long been recognized as an important element of many prejudices, such as racism. Allport (1954) described hate as extreme dislike associated with prejudice that produces aggressive impulses. Kovel (1970) characterized the traditional, blatant form of prejudice, which has historically defined the racial attitudes of many White Americans, as domineering racism. The domineering racist, according to Kovel, is the type of person “who acts out bigoted beliefs—he represents the open flame of racial hatred” (p. 54).

Prejudice, however, is a collective phenomenon related to one’s social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) as well as to one’s personal identity and corresponding attitudes. Specifically, when personal identity is salient, a person’s individual needs, standards, beliefs, and motives primarily determine his or her behavior. In contrast, when social identity is salient, “people come to perceive themselves as more interchangeable exemplars of a social category than as unique personalities defined by their individual differences from others” (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987, p. 50).
Under these conditions, collective needs, goals, and standards are the critical determinants of responses. Illustrating the dynamics of this distinction, Verkuylten and Hagendoorn (1998) found that when individual identity was primed, individual differences in authoritarianism were the major predictor of prejudice toward immigrants. In contrast, when social identity (i.e., national identity) was made salient, in-group stereotypes and standards primarily predicted prejudiced attitudes toward immigrants.

Sternberg (2003) recently extended conceptions of hate in a way that applies to both individuals and groups. He wrote, “Typically, hate is thought of as a single emotion. But there is reason to believe that it has multiple components that can manifest themselves in different ways on different occasions” (p. 306). The three main components that Sternberg identified are (a) the negation of intimacy, which originates from feelings of disgust; (b) passion, which is expressed in intense anger or fear during periods of threat; and (c) decision-commitment, which involves devaluation of the other group through contempt.

In this chapter, we draw on Sternberg’s (2003) conception of hate in our analysis of the psychology of prejudice. We focus on the prejudice of White Americans toward Black Americans because of the central role that this phenomenon has had historically in social relations, policy, and politics in the United States and because it is the most extensively researched prejudice within psychology. We propose that affect plays a key role in racial prejudice and that the seeds of hatred are present in even subtle contemporary forms of prejudice.

We begin by exploring historical changes in the expression of Whites’ prejudice toward Blacks from the overt, dominative form to more subtle forms. We then illustrate the dynamics of contemporary prejudice by examining one common form, aversive racism, and its expression in subtle bias. Next, we consider how the interracial anxiety and discomfort that normally characterize aversive racists’ feelings toward Blacks can become the seeds of hatred when Whites are provoked or threatened, and how negative stereotypes and justifying ideologies can facilitate the development of hatred and the expression of open discrimination. We conclude by suggesting ways to combat contemporary racial prejudice, focusing on the seeds of hate in normally subtle forms of bias.

THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY RACISM

Overt expressions of prejudice and blatant forms of discrimination have declined significantly over the past several decades (Bobo, 2001). These declines have been attributed, at least in part, to the landmark civil rights legislation of the 1960s, which made racial discrimination illegal and helped to facilitate more egalitarian norms and standards in personal
behavior (McConahay, 1986). Even after the enactment of such progressive legislation, the potential for racial attitudes to erupt into violence against Blacks still remains. This violence is frequently manifested in hate crimes, which are defined as criminal acts motivated in whole or in part by prejudice toward another group (Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002). Because the standards for reporting hate crimes have varied, it is difficult to determine whether incidences of hate crimes have changed systematically over time. Nevertheless, the number of reported hate crimes against Blacks increased from 1,689 (36% of all reported hate crimes) in 1991 to 3,573 (39% of reported hate crimes) in 1998 (Perry, 2002).

Although we recognize that blatant forms of racism still exist and are frequently the basis of violence against Blacks, in this chapter we focus on how the more subtle forms of bias, those that characterize the attitudes of mainstream White Americans, can involve and support a psychology of hate. In particular, we examine how biases in the ways people think, in the nature of their motivations, and in their socialization can predispose people to act in prejudicial and discriminatory ways against members of other groups. Although these processes most typically produce more mild or subtle forms of discrimination, under conditions of competition and threat such biases can lead to explicit conflict and overt expressions of hatred. It is perhaps because of its many sources and manifestations that bias and perceptions of bias play a prominent role in contemporary race relations in the United States (Gallup Organization, 2002).

Research on contemporary racial attitudes, in particular, has hypothesized not only that affect and cognition are distinguishable components of attitudes but also that they may reflect different, and potentially contradictory, types of evaluations and intentions. Whereas the traditional, dominative form of racial prejudice is considered to be direct and generally univalently negative (McConahay, 1986), the contemporary racial attitudes of Whites, particularly White Americans, are hypothesized to be more complex, reflecting both negative and positive reactions.

Approaches such as symbolic racism theory (Sears, Henry, & Kosterman, 2000), modern racism theory (McConahay, 1986), and the aversive racism framework (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; see also Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998) converge to emphasize dissociations between the cognitive and affective components of contemporary racial attitudes. A crucial underlying feature that these three different forms of contemporary racial bias share is the fundamental conflict between the denial of personal prejudice and underlying unconscious negative feelings.

What distinguishes the different perspectives on contemporary racism are the conscious beliefs that permit discrimination to be expressed. The aversive racism framework has assumed that these positive attitudes are based on political and social liberalism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Symbolic racism theory emphasizes that beliefs about individualism and meritocracy that
become racialized motivate opposition to policies designed to benefit racial and ethnic minorities. Modern racism theory similarly proposes that beliefs associated with conservative ideologies can justify discriminatory behaviors, but this theory places more emphasis on the moderating effects of contexts that provide a justification for negative responses to minorities. However, one commonality shared by all of these approaches, and that reflects the complexity of contemporary racial attitudes, is the idea that racial bias is expressed in more subtle ways than is "old-fashioned" racism. In the next section, to illustrate the dynamics of contemporary prejudice, we examine one of these approaches, aversive racism theory, in more detail.

**AVERSIVE RACISM**

According to the aversive racism perspective, many people who consciously, explicitly, and sincerely support egalitarian principles and believe themselves to be nonprejudiced also harbor negative feelings about Blacks and other historically disadvantaged groups. These negative feelings can significantly influence behavior, typically in terms of avoidance or failure to respond positively rather than in terms of direct hostility (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). In other words, these feelings, independent of egalitarian beliefs, may produce negative responses toward Blacks ranging from avoidance of direct interracial contact to discrimination and interracial aggression.

A critical aspect of the aversive racism framework (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) is the development of underlying unconscious negative feelings by Whites toward Blacks as a consequence of normal, almost unavoidable, and frequently functional cognitive, motivational, and social-cultural process. In terms of cognitive processes, people inherently categorize others into groups, typically in terms that delineate their own group from other groups. This classification, in turn, creates bias: Once categorized, people begin to value others in their own group more and may often devalue others belonging to different groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). In the United States, Whites automatically categorize people on the basis of race, and this categorization spontaneously elicits racial stereotypes (Blair, 2001).

Motivational processes relate to people's desires to satisfy basic needs of power, status, and control, not only for themselves but also for their group (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In a world with limited resources, one of the ways that people maintain control or power is by hindering the progress of competing groups. The effects of sociocultural influences can be seen in the tendency for people to internalize the racially biased traditional values and beliefs of American society, beliefs that are often perpetuated by the media. Nevertheless, current cultural values may also be partly responsible for perpetuating the strong convictions concerning
fairness, justice, and racial equality held by most White Americans. The existence of both the conscious endorsement of egalitarian values and the unconscious negative feelings toward Blacks makes aversive racists' attitudes complex and produces a distinct pattern of discriminatory behavior. In the next section, we examine the implications of the aversive racism framework and illustrate how bias is expressed in subtle ways but can have profound consequences.

Unmasking Subtle Bias

The aversive racism framework helps to identify when discrimination against Blacks and other minority groups will or will not occur. Whereas old-fashioned racists exhibit a direct and overt pattern of discrimination, aversive racists' actions may appear more variable and inconsistent. At times they discriminate (manifesting their negative feelings), and at other times they do not (reflecting their egalitarian beliefs). Our research has provided a framework for understanding this complex pattern of discrimination.

Because aversive racists consciously recognize and endorse egalitarian values, and because they truly aspire to be nonprejudiced, they will not discriminate in situations with strong social norms when discrimination would be obvious to others and to themselves. Specifically, we propose that when people are presented with a situation in which the normatively appropriate response is clear (when right and wrong are clearly defined), aversive racists will not discriminate against Blacks. In these circumstances, aversive racists will be especially motivated to avoid feelings, beliefs, and behaviors that could be associated with racist intent. Wrongdoing, which could directly threaten their nonprejudiced self-image, would be too costly. However, because they still possess feelings of unease, such feelings will eventually be expressed, but in subtle, indirect, and rationalizable ways. Discrimination will tend to occur in situations in which normative structure is weak, when the guidelines for appropriate behavior are vague, or when the basis for social judgment is ambiguous. In addition, discrimination will occur when an aversive racist can justify or rationalize a negative response on the basis of some factor other than race. Under these circumstances, aversive racists may engage in behaviors that ultimately harm Blacks, but in ways that allow them to maintain their self-image as nonprejudiced.

Aversive racists may be identified by a constellation of characteristic responses to racial issues and interracial situations. First, in contrast to old-fashioned racists, aversive racists endorse fair and just treatment of all groups. Second, despite their conscious good intentions, aversive racists unconsciously harbor feelings of uneasiness toward Blacks and thus try to avoid interracial interaction. This aspect of aversive racism directly relates to the distancing component in Sternberg's (2003) model of hate. Third, when interracial interaction is unavoidable, they experience anxiety and discomfort.
and consequently try to disengage from such an interaction as quickly as possible. Fourth, because part of the discomfort that they experience is due to a concern about acting inappropriately and appearing prejudiced, they strictly adhere to established rules and codes of behavior in interracial situations they cannot avoid. Finally, their feelings will be expressed, but in subtle, unintentional, and rationalizable ways that disadvantage minorities or unfairly benefit the majority group. Nevertheless, in terms of conscious intent, aversive racists intend not to discriminate against Blacks, and they behave accordingly when it is possible for them to monitor the appropriateness of their behavior.

We have found consistent support across a broad range of situations for the basic proposition that contemporary biases are expressed in subtle rather than blatant ways (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Gaertner et al., 1997). One of our earliest experiments (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977) demonstrated how aversive racism can operate in dramatic and consequential ways. The scenario for the experiment was inspired by an incident in the mid-1960s in which 38 people witnessed the stabbing of a woman, Kitty Genovese, without a single bystander intervening to help. What might account for this behavior? Research by Darley and Latané (1968) showed that feelings of responsibility play a key role. If a person witnesses an emergency knowing that he or she is the only bystander, that person bears all of the responsibility for helping. Consequently, the likelihood of helping is high. In contrast, if a person witnesses an emergency but believes that there are several other witnesses who might help, then the responsibility for helping is shared. Moreover, if the person believes that someone else will help or has already helped, the likelihood that the bystander will take action is reduced.

To further explore the dynamics of emergency intervention across races, we created a situation in the laboratory in which White participants witnessed a staged emergency involving a Black or White victim. We led some of our participants to believe that they would be the only witness to this emergency and led others to believe there would be other White people who would also witness the emergency. Because aversive racists do not act in overtly bigoted ways, we predicted that Whites would not discriminate when they were the only witness and the responsibility for helping was clearly focused on them. However, we anticipated that Whites would help Black victims much less frequently than White victims when they had a justifiable excuse not to get involved, such as the belief that one of the other witnesses would take responsibility for helping.

The results supported these predictions. When White participants believed that they were the only witness, they helped both White and Black victims very frequently (over 85% of the time) and equivalently. There was no evidence of blatant racism. In contrast, when they thought that others had witnessed the emergency and could therefore rationalize a decision not
to help on the basis of a factor other than race, they helped Black victims only half as often as White victims (37.5% vs. 75%). These results illustrate the operation of subtle biases in relatively dramatic, spontaneous, and life-threatening circumstances involving a failure to help, rather than an action intentionally aimed at doing harm. Nevertheless, when the situation permits discrimination while allowing a White person to avoid an attribution of bigotry, aversive racism can have consequences as profound as the effects of dominative racism (racism motivated by overt hatred).

Less dramatic, but potentially equally devastating, is the influence of aversive racism in the workplace. Aversive racism can contribute to the economic stratification of Whites and Blacks under conditions that permit the expression of bias while avoiding the realization of racial motivations. Labor statistics continue to demonstrate fundamental disparities in the economic status of Blacks relative to Whites—a gap that has not only persisted but also widened in recent years for some important indicators, such as family income (see Blank, 2001). Aversive racism may be one contributing factor helping to maintain this economic disparity.

The power and destructive nature of aversive racism can be especially evident at the time of hiring, when it can affect how qualifications are perceived and weighed in a manner that systematically disadvantages Black relative to White applicants. In particular, the aversive racism framework suggests that bias will not be expressed when a person is clearly qualified or unqualified for a position, because the appropriate decision is obvious. However, when the appropriate decision is unclear—for example, when the evidence is ambiguous as to whether a candidate's qualifications meet the criteria for selection or when a candidate's file has conflicting information (e.g., some strong and some weak features)—bias will occur.

In one study of hiring decisions (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000), college students were presented with excerpts from an interview and were then asked to evaluate candidates for a position in an ostensibly new program for peer counseling at their university. In the study, White participants were asked to evaluate a Black or White candidate who had credentials that were systematically manipulated to represent very strong, moderate, or very weak qualifications for the position. As predicted by the aversive racism framework, when the candidate's credentials clearly qualified him or her for the position (strong qualifications) or when the credentials were clearly inappropriate (weak qualifications), there was no discrimination against the Black candidate. However, when the candidate's qualifications for the position were less obvious and the appropriate decision was more ambiguous (moderate qualifications), White participants recommended the Black candidate significantly less often than a White candidate with the exact same credentials. Moreover, when the responses of participants from 1989 were compared with those of 1999, although overt expressions of prejudice (measured by items on a self-report prejudice scale) declined over this 10-year
period, the pattern of subtle discrimination in selection decisions remained essentially unchanged.

Thus, although the discrimination associated with aversive racism may be expressed subtly, its consequences can be comparable to traditional, direct expressions of prejudice resulting in threats to the personal and economic well-being of Blacks. Although our research has focused on race relations in the United States, the processes of aversive racism are not limited by national boundaries and may reflect attitudes toward a number of different groups when overt forms of discrimination are recognized as inappropriate (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).

Thus far, we have noted the role of Sternberg’s (2003) first component of hate, the negation of intimacy, based in negative affective reactions, in contemporary prejudice and have illustrated how subtle forms of bias still function as social control mechanisms that limit the opportunities for Blacks. In the next section, we explore how the racial ambivalence of Whites and the accompanying emotions of discomfort and anxiety can, under conditions of provocation and threat, be transformed into more directed negative emotions, such as fear or anger, that motivate open aggression toward Blacks.

Ambivalence, Amplification, and Response to Provocation and Threat

The existence of nearly unavoidable racial biases, based on normal cognitive, motivational, and sociocultural influences, along with the simultaneous desire to be nonprejudiced represents a basic duality of attitudes for aversive racists. This duality produces racial ambivalence, which often results in response amplification (Katz, Wackenhut, & Hass, 1986). From the aversive racism perspective, because bias is based in Whites’ unacknowledged negative feelings toward Blacks, this response amplification often takes the form of more extreme negative responses toward Blacks than Whites.

Stephan and Stephan (1985) posited that a key factor in intergroup ambivalence is the anxiety resulting from intergroup interaction. As suggested by the aversive racism framework, interracial interactions are particularly anxiety provoking. Besides the anxiety aroused within Whites when interacting with a person from a group with which they may have had limited contact, fears of acting in a way that reveals one’s racial biases can heighten the anxiety and discomfort that aversive racists experience in interracial interaction. Richeson and Shelton (2003) found that such attempts by aversive racists to avoid wrongdoing appear to involve significant conscious effort. Whites high in implicit prejudice toward Blacks (assessed using a response-time measure) performed more poorly on a cognitively demanding task after interacting with a Black person than did Whites low in implicit prejudice. Richeson and Shelton proposed that for high implicitly prejudiced
Whites, the cognitive effort required to monitor their interracial behavior depleted their cognitive resources, resulting in a decrement in performance on the subsequent task. Members of minority groups may also experience intergroup anxiety, but in part for different reasons. Because of the potential for discrimination, Blacks tend to approach interracial interactions with Whites with anxiety, guardedness, and underlying mistrust (Hyers & Swin, 1998).

As Stephan and Stephan (1985) proposed, because arousal created by one source (e.g., interracial anxiety) can be transferred and attributed to another source (e.g., perceived threat), interracial anxiety can amplify Whites’ affective reactions and consequently produces more extreme behavioral responses to Blacks than to Whites. That is, to the extent that arousal, originally interpreted as anxiety, becomes added to the arousal elicited by threat and reinterpreted as the emotional response to threat, the reactions to interracial threat are likely to be more intense than to intraracial threat (Zillman, 1996). This process of transfer and misattribution of arousal is particularly likely to occur when people are not conscious of the original source of arousal, as are aversive racists who do not typically acknowledge their negative reactions to Blacks. Thus, the more diffuse emotions of interracial anxiety and discomfort that are experienced by aversive racists and typically lead to avoidance can (under some circumstances) become the seeds for hate—they can readily be transformed into more intense negative emotions that motivate violent and aggressive actions toward Blacks. In terms of Sternberg’s (2003) model of hate, interracial anxiety and discomfort can help amplify the impact of interracial threat, producing anger and fear that are expressed directly in hostility toward Blacks. In this way, aversive racism may have consequences similar to those of blatant dominant racism in response to racial threats.

Research by Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1981) illustrates how subtle prejudice, which may not be manifested under most normal circumstances, can be a critical factor in interracial aggression and hostility under other conditions. In one study, White male students were led to believe that they were participating in a behavior modification study. They were told that they should administer shocks to another person, actually a Black or White confederate, when a signal indicated that the person’s heart rate fell below a predetermined level. In one condition designed to provoke anger, the participant overheard the confederate say to the experimenter (before the task was performed) that the participant looked too “dumb” and “stupid” to operate the apparatus. In a control condition, the confederate simply stated that he was ready to proceed with the experiment and had no objections about participating. In the control condition, where they were not provoked by the insults, White participants administered somewhat lower intensity shocks to Black than to White confederates. From the perspective of aversive racism, White participants were particularly cautious about injuring a Black person without justification. However, after being angered in the insult condition,
White participants administered substantially higher levels of shock to Black than to White confederates. That is, when they were provoked by the confederate, which aroused anger and provided a nonracial explanation for retaliation, Whites were particularly aggressive toward Blacks.

Consistent with the aversive racism framework, Whites’ willingness to shock Blacks more than Whites is also moderated by situational factors relating the salience of compliance to nonprejudiced norms. Their interracial aggression is inhibited when Whites anticipate censure from others; it is facilitated when Whites feel freed from prevailing norms through conditions that make them feel anonymous and deindividuated (Donnerstein & Donnerstein, 1973; Donnerstein, Donnerstein, Simon, & Ditrichs, 1972; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1981). Analogously, Mullen's (1986) analysis of newspaper reports of Blacks being lynched by White mobs suggests that the greater anonymity and deindividuation of being in a larger group is a significant contributing factor in such violence against Blacks.

Even without direct provocation, general feelings of intergroup threat can be a catalyst for the transformation of aversive racism into the open, dominative form characterized by racial antipathy and hatred. Theories based on functional relations often point to competition and consequent perceived threat as a fundamental cause of intergroup conflict. Realistic group conflict theory (Campbell, 1965), for example, posits that perceived group competition for resources produces efforts to reduce the access of other groups to the resources. From a sociological perspective (see also Bobo, 1999), Blumer (1958) wrote, “Race prejudice is a defensive reaction to such challenging of the sense of group position . . . As such, race prejudice is a protective device. It functions, however shortsightedly, to preserve the integrity and position of the dominant group” (p. 5). From a psychological orientation, the classic Robbers Cave study by Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) similarly proposed that the functional relations between groups are critical in determining intergroup attitudes. According to this position, competition between groups produces prejudice and discrimination, which become instruments for protecting the resources and opportunities for one’s group (Esses et al., 2001). In contrast, intergroup interdependence and cooperative interactions that result in successful outcomes tend to reduce intergroup bias.

Although the effect of economic threat has traditionally received the primary empirical attention (Hovland & Sears, 1940) as a cause of hate and violence against Blacks (e.g., lynchings), other forms of threat, such as symbolic threats to a group’s sense of identity or to a group’s cultural values and ideals (Stephan et al., 2002), can arouse intense affective reactions and facilitate open discrimination. Glaser, Dixit, and Green (2002) theorized that “hate crimes against African Americans typically result not so much from economic concerns or frustrations, or competition for material resources, but more often from the perceived threat to the integrity, separateness, and
hegemony of the ingroup” (p. 180). They found that White racists were more threatened by, and advocated violence more strongly in response to, interracial marriage and Blacks moving into the neighborhood than job competition. McDevitt, Levin, and Bennett’s (2002) analysis revealed that a substantial portion of hate crimes, 33% in their sample, were based on defensive or retaliatory motivations related to perceived threat. Thus, the roots of the many violent actions against Blacks may reside in collective identity and the forces of in-group favoritism—the fundamental elements of aversive racism (Gaertner et al., 1997).

Although the Robbers Cave study described in detail by Sherif et al. (1961) is widely considered a classic example of the role of competition and threat in intergroup conflict, in the course of the study, intergroup hate began to emerge even before explicit competition was introduced. In the study, twenty-two 12-year-old boys attending summer camp were randomly assigned to two groups (who subsequently named themselves the Eagles and the Rattlers). The groups first interacted in isolation from each other, unaware of the other group’s existence, and later were brought together in physical proximity, but without direct contact. Over the ensuing several weeks, the groups engaged in several competitive activities that generated overt intergroup conflict. Finally, toward the end of the experience, the groups participated in a series of cooperative activities designed to ameliorate conflict and bias.

Sherif et al.’s (1961) detailed account of the first few days at Robbers Cave reveals that intergroup bias actually preceded the introduction of functionally competitive relations between the groups. Even before the groups met face-to-face or engaged one another in competitive activities, knowledge of the mere existence of the other group appeared to initiate bias and create new stereotypes. Sherif et al. observed,

When the in-group began to be clearly delineated, there was a tendency to consider all others as out-group . . . The Rattlers didn’t know another group existed in camp until they heard the Eagles on the ball diamond; but from that time on the out-group figured prominently in their lives . . . Simpson was convinced that “those guys” were down at our diamond again . . . When the Eagles were playing on the ball diamond and heard the Rattlers, Wilson referred to those “nigger campers.” (pp. 94–95)

Consistent with the hypothesized catalytic role of threat, however, the introduction of competitive relations between the groups (in the form of repeated competitive athletic activities centering around tug-of-war, baseball, and touch football) during the second week further generated derogatory stereotypes and escalated conflict between the groups. The groups conducted raids on the other group’s cabins that resulted in the destruction and theft of property; the boys carried sticks, baseball bats, and socks filled with rocks as
potential weapons; fistfights broke out between members of the groups; and
food and garbage fights erupted in the dining hall. In addition, group mem-
bers regularly exchanged verbal insults (e.g., “ladies first”) and name-calling
(e.g., “sissies,” “stinkers,” “pigs,” “bums,” “cheaters,” and “communists”).

Although stereotypes are often assumed to be a causal factor in dis-

crimination, Sherif et al.’s (1961) observation of the emergence of stereo-
types following conflict further implicates the role of normative justifications
(which is central to the aversive racism framework) on the expressions of
discrimination toward Blacks. As Allport (1954) noted, stereotypes can be a
consequence as well as a cause of discrimination because they serve to both
justify past episodes of discrimination and perpetuate new forms. In the next
section, we review the effects of stereotypes and norms that devalue Blacks
as a key factor in the expression of racism.

Social Devaluation: From Subtle to Overt Bias

The third component Sternberg (2003) identified in his model of hate
is decision/commitment, “characterized by cognitions of devaluation and
diminution through contempt for the target group” (p. 308). Staub (1996)
also identified the systematic devaluation and dehumanization of members
of another group as a key element in the “psychology of evil” leading to open,
and often mass, violence against the group. This aspect of the psychology of
hate also has roots in prejudice, including contemporary forms such as aver-
sive racism as well as the traditional blatant form.

As we noted earlier, social categorization forms a foundation for the
development of intergroup biases, both blatant and subtle. In the United
States, people tend to automatically categorize others on the basis of race
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993), although other ways of categorizing them are
possible (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). When people (or objects) are catego-
rized into groups, actual differences between members of the same category
tend to be minimized and often ignored in making decisions or forming
impressions. At the same time, between-group differences tend to become
exaggerated (Turner et al., 1987). Once social categorization occurs, people
tend to respond more favorably to in-group than to out-group members in a
wide range of ways.

Perceiving others in terms of their group membership initiates, typi-
cally spontaneously, an overall bias in which people categorized as in-group
members are evaluated more favorably than out-group members (see Gaert-
ner & Dovidio, 2000). In general, people tend to ascribe more positive traits
to in-group members, are more attracted to in-group members, recall more
positive and fewer negative incidences of the behaviors of in-group relative
to out-group members, and are more likely to make situational attributions
for their negative actions and dispositional attributions for their positive
behaviors (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Furthermore, different standards of
justice and morality are applied to in-group and out-group members: More emphasis is placed on processes of procedural fairness and justice in interactions with in-group members than with out-group members (Tyler & Blader, 2000), often leading to the “moral exclusion” of members of the out-group. These biases occur even when assignment to groups is random or based on socially irrelevant criteria, such as whether one is an “overestimator” or “underestimator,” and become more pronounced for more enduring and important group memberships (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992).

Beyond its cognitive and general evaluative effects, the social categorization of people as in-group and out-group members can also have immediate affective consequences (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993). At the most basic level, there is a tendency for more positive emotional responses to in-group members. However, unique emotional reactions (e.g., fear, disgust; see Mackie & Smith, 2002) may also be elicited through social categorization of people as members of meaningful out-groups. Also, people perceive that in-group and out-group members have different capacities for human emotions. Paladino et al. (2002) proposed that out-group members are perceived as less fully “human” compared with in-group members and thus have a more basic and limited range of emotional reactions. In-group members are attributed higher order, uniquely human emotions (or “sentiments”), such as love, hope, contempt, and resentment, whereas out-group members are attributed more basic, non-uniquely human emotions, such as joy, surprise, fear, and anger.

The cognitive and affective responses to classifying others as out-group members also combine to predispose people to devalue members of some groups and elicit distinctly negative emotions. In general, people tend to view an out-group as more homogeneous (i.e., the members are more alike) than the in-group (Mullen & Hu, 1989), and this effect, coupled with the tendency to ascribe more negative traits to out-group members, predisposes people to negative stereotyping of the out-group. This process was illustrated in the excerpt from Sherif et al.’s (1961) notes on the Robbers Cave study, presented earlier. Thus, even though many Whites do not admit to consciously holding negative racial stereotypes, there is evidence that even Whites who say they are not prejudiced (such as aversive racists) and who may not consciously endorse negative stereotypes typically associate negative stereotypic characteristics with Blacks, implicitly and unconsciously (Blair, 2001).

Affective reactions to different groups are then shaped by the content of a group’s stereotypic qualities, primarily on the basis of the dimensions of perceived competence and warmth. Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu (2002) found that whereas groups high in competence and high in warmth (such as Black professionals) produce admiration, groups viewed as low in competence and low in warmth (such as poor Blacks) generate contempt. In general, the more the lower status of another group is attributed to controllable factors (such as incompetence from a lack of effort), the more negative is
the affect aroused by the group (Weiner, 1995). Because the types of perceptions that generate feelings of contempt are similar to those that aversive racists might adopt to justify a negative response, even aversive racists may be predisposed to exhibit overt discrimination under these conditions.

Cultures also tend to develop system-justifying ideologies that provide an acceptable explanation for the different contemporary statuses of various groups within a society that might have historical roots in injustice and discrimination. Jost and Major (2001) explained that

if a system that distributes outcomes unequally among its members is to survive, then its members must view the inequalities as justified and legitimate. Thus, perceived legitimacy must come not only from those who benefit, but also from those who are disadvantaged by the system. (p. 14)

Glick (2002) identified this type of ideological commitment by majority group members as a determining factor in scapegoating, in which innocent groups become the target of displaced aggression. Staub (1989), who refined the traditional frustration-aggression perspective on scapegoating in his social psychological explanation of genocide, proposed that difficult social, economic, or political conditions can frustrate people's basic needs relating to esteem, well-being, and belonging. According to Glick, this frustration, when experienced collectively, can often lead to scapegoating movements that focus social blame on another group. These movements are successful to the extent that people believe that action against the group, even if it is objectively innocent, will address their problems directly or meet their needs indirectly (e.g., for esteem, control, or belonging). Collective hostile action against the group initiates a destructive and escalating cycle that becomes justified through further devaluation of the group. Under these circumstances, hate becomes rationalized with evolving stereotypes that warrant contempt, and aggression is seen as instrumental, rational, and appropriate.

Traditionally disadvantaged groups, such as Blacks in the United States, are often trapped by cultural legitimizing ideologies. Collective action by minority group members requires a rejection of these ideologies, but rejecting such fundamental codes can arouse threat and contempt among Whites (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Furthermore, contexts that arouse perceptions of group competition increase the salience of ideologies that justify discrimination (Jost & Major, 2001) and elicit the types of negative emotions, such as contempt or hatred, that can produce aggressive reactions.

Cultural values expressed in social norms have a particularly important function moderating the expression of racial prejudice. Social norms in the United States typically function to inhibit prejudice and discrimination. As we illustrated earlier, aversive racists do not discriminate when the acts will
violates dominant egalitarian norms. However, deviant behavior can occur in direct opposition to these norms. McDevitt et al. (2002) found that the majority of hate crimes that they studied were motivated by the "thrill" of the crime, which is related to the violation of conventional norms and standards.

Nevertheless, despite general norms against prejudice and discrimination, more local and immediate norms can frequently support racial bias. Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, and Vaughn (1994), for instance, found that participants who heard another student support prejudicial views (which signaled prejudiced contextual norms) subsequently adopted more racist positions than did those in a control condition. In contrast, those who heard another student condemn racial prejudice later advocated less racist positions. More important, these effects occurred equivalently for participants' private and public responses, indicating that the communication of these immediate norms relating to prejudice influenced participants' internal standards.

Because aversive racism represents a latent form of bias that is strongly moderated by social circumstances and norms, a change in perceived norms can allow this bias to operate more directly and openly. For example, Gaertner, Dovidio, and Johnson (1982) demonstrated, consistent with the findings of Gaertner and Dovidio (1977) discussed earlier, that although White bystanders who were the only witness to an emergency helped Black and White victims equally, those in a group of White nonresponsive bystanders conformed to the immediate norm of nonintervention more when the victim was Black than when the victim was White. Participants' physiological responses and postexperimental explanations indicated that they felt normative pressure from the group not to intervene in this situation; however, they succumbed to this pressure more when the victim was Black than when the victim was White.

This latent form of racism also has important organizational implications. In corporate settings, racial discrimination in personnel selection decisions emerges when norms, which typically condemn discrimination, change. For example, Whites are more likely to discriminate against Black job applicants when they learn that an organizational authority condones discrimination (Brief, Buttram, Elliott, Reizenstein, & McClune, 1995). People who harbor contemporary forms of racism may be especially sensitive to this change in norms. Brief, Dietz, Cohen, Pugh, and Vaslow (2000) demonstrated that when an organizational superior provided a business justification that permitted discrimination on an ostensibly nonracial basis, White participants, particularly those high in modern racism (McConahay, 1986), discriminated against Black candidates in their recommendations. Thus, besides its subtle contemporary influence, if left unaddressed, aversive racism provides the seed for bias to emerge when conditions allow or encourage a more open expression of discrimination.
CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have explored the role of hate, both individually and collectively, in racial prejudice and discrimination. We have argued that although dominative racism, or racism motivated by racial hatred (Kovel, 1970), is now relatively rare, contemporary forms of racism still have a negative impact on Blacks. In addition, the biases associated with contemporary forms of racism tend to be subtle. With respect to aversive racism, discrimination typically occurs when the behavior can be justified on the basis of some factor other than race, insulating the aversive racist from attributions of bigotry.

Although the expression bias from aversive racism is typically subtle, its effects can be as pernicious as the impact of traditional, overt racism, as seen for instance in the restriction of economic opportunities for Blacks. Moreover, aversive racism contains the seeds of more blatant racism, rooted in the three main components of Sternberg’s (2003) duplex model of hate: the negation of intimacy, intense anger or fear during periods of threat, and devaluation of the other group through contempt. First, aversive racists experience anxiety and discomfort in interracial situations, which motivates avoidance of contact and limits intimacy (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Second, when confronted with interracial situations, anxiety and discomfort can intensify affective responses to provocation and threat, leading to more negative emotional reactions and more extreme actions toward Blacks than might otherwise occur toward Whites (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Third, the forces of in-group favoritism, which represent a critical underpinning of aversive racism (Gaertner et al., 1997), provide a foundation from which negative stereotypes evolve, different standards for fairness and justice develop, and members of other groups become devalued through justifying ideologies. As a consequence, when prevailing norms against prejudice become weakened or superseded by local norms that support discrimination, aversive racists may be predisposed to engage in blatant and aggressive forms of discrimination.

Although hate crimes are currently rare, with deviant acts comprising only a small portion of all crimes (Perry, 2002), even subtle forms of contemporary prejudice reflect a potential for extreme responses motivated by racial hatred that may be realized under conditions of threat and supportive norms or cultural values. Some scholars have argued that these norms and values have already begun to change. Torres (1999) wrote the following:

The attitude in the United States today gives rise to a belief that bigotry is no longer politically incorrect, and is once again finding a degree of respectability. The prejudicial attitudes that have always been present in some people have not been manifested because the social and political climate was not conducive to such expressions of bigotry. However, what used to be kept below the surface or whispered behind closed doors
about African Americans is now openly flaunted because of a social and political climate now conducive to such expression. (p. 57)

Although we do not necessarily agree with Torres’s assessment of how dramatically the social and political climate has changed, we do agree, on the basis of the psychological research and theory about prejudice, that the capacity for bigotry and racial hatred does reside just “below the surface.”

We have proposed a variety of techniques for limiting the effects of aversive racism and combating aversive racism at its roots (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). These include strengthening policies and norms against discrimination, making aversive racists aware of their prejudice and how their biases are expressed, providing aversive racism opportunities to develop and practice nonprejudiced responses, and altering the primary basis of social categorization from different racial groups (i.e., Blacks and Whites) to members of a common superordinate group (e.g., on the basis of university or national identity).

To control for the adverse impact of aversive racism on Blacks, policymakers need to design policies and laws to address subtle forms of discrimination. As Krieger (1995, 1998) has observed, for successful prosecution, current antidiscrimination laws require that racial bias be identified as the sole cause for disparate treatment, that intention to discriminate be demonstrated, and that the action directly harm the complainant. Research on aversive racism has shown that disparate treatment is most likely to occur in combination with other factors that provide nonracial rationales for negative treatment; that racial bias is typically unconscious and often unintentional; and that disparate treatment, because of in-group biases, often represents in-group favoritism (pro-White responses) rather than outright rejection of out-group members (anti-Black responses). Thus, as Krieger explained, the consequences of contemporary forms of bias are difficult to address with existing legislation. Revising laws to combat subtle forms of discrimination can convey an important message to society—one that would enhance the salience of egalitarian standards and promote more inclusive social norms (McComahay, 1986).

Whereas legal interventions offer more immediate control of the effects of subtle bias rather than a “cure” for contemporary racism, other strategies can combat it directly by focusing on its roots—unacknowledged negative feelings that can evolve into more openly negative emotions such as contempt and hate. In general, traditional approaches that focus on the evils of prejudice and discrimination tend to be ineffective in addressing aversive racists. Aversive racists already endorse egalitarian values, recognize norms against prejudice, and possess quite positive conscious cognitions about Blacks. In addition, because they believe that they are not prejudiced, they may not see the relevance of such appeals to them. However, because they experience negative affect with regard to Blacks,
strategies aimed at this component may be more effective than more traditional approaches to combating prejudice (Dovidio, Esses, Beach, & Gaertner, 2002).

Esses and Dovidio (2002), for example, found that Whites who were asked to focus on their feelings, rather than their cognitions, while viewing incidents of discrimination against Blacks subsequently showed less avoidance and an interest in more intimate contact with Blacks. Considerable research further demonstrates that intergroup contact under appropriate conditions specified by the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998) is one of the most effective and robust strategies for improving intergroup relations, largely because it helps to alleviate intergroup anxiety (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000). Interventions that help to promote an inclusive, one-group categorization for groups (such as Blacks and Whites) that were previously seen as different groups can enhance the effectiveness of intergroup contact by redirecting the forces of in-group favoritism to produce more positive affective reactions and improving attitudes towards others formerly perceived as only out-group members. Emphasizing common group identity (e.g., by wearing clothing demonstrating common university membership) has been shown to eliminate Whites' racial biases in helping Blacks (Nier, Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, & Ward, 2001).

In conclusion, although blatant prejudice still exists and crimes against Blacks represent a large proportion of hate crimes (Perry, 2002), contemporary racism is generally more subtle than the traditional form, and a large proportion of Whites who consciously endorse egalitarian principles are unaware of their prejudices. Thus, the simple characterization of hate as intense dislike (Allport, 1954) rarely characterizes the racial attitudes of White Americans today. Instead, more sophisticated conceptualizations of hate, such as Sternberg's (2003) multidimensional duplex model, are needed to capture the complexity and potentially destructive nature of contemporary prejudice more accurately.

Old-fashioned, dominative racism and contemporary racism are frequently considered qualitatively different types, but the seeds of hate, as identified by Sternberg, are present even in Whites who possess a subtle form of prejudice, such as aversive racism. As Torres (1999) argued, this prejudice represents latent racism that can be transformed into open hatred, discrimination, and violence by threat, provocation, negative stereotypes, and cultural ideologies that justify disadvantage. Greater prejudice toward people with ethnic backgrounds from the Middle East, support for more exclusionary immigration policies, and the increased incidence of hate crimes toward Arabs illustrate the dramatic impact of a single catastrophic event, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States, on basic orientations toward minority groups (Esse, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2002).

Nevertheless, a better understanding of the relation between a psychology of hate and racial bias can guide interventions that effectively address the
potential for hate, hostility, and group-based violence at the foundations of prejudice, which too often lies just below the surface.

REFERENCES


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