Included but Invisible? Subtle Bias, Common Identity, and the Darker Side of “We”

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This article discusses how seemingly well-intended policies and interventions to reduce intergroup bias by emphasizing colorblindness through overarching commonalities between groups may, either unintentionally or strategically, inhibit efforts to address group-based inequities. First, we discuss the roots of bias in social categorization process, and how changing the way people think about group memberships from separate groups to members of the same group with shared identity improves intergroup attitudes. Second, we describe the subtle nature of contemporary biases, which can help obscure group-based inequities. Third, we explain how and why majority and minority groups may have different preferences for recategorization and consider the potential consequences of these different perspectives for recognizing and addressing disparity and discrimination. We conclude by considering the policy and structural implications of these processes for achieving more equitable societies, not only in principle but also in practice.

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Interventions to reduce bias against members of underrepresented groups frequently emphasize the importance of inclusiveness and overarching commonalities among groups (Houlette et al., 2004; Stephan & Stephan, 2001). Members of socially dominant groups have traditionally been taught to be “tolerant” of members of other groups, and often to be race- and gender-blind in their treatment of members of stigmatized groups to promote intergroup harmony. Indeed, as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. proclaimed in his famous “I Have a Dream” speech in 1963, colorblindness has, historically, been an important standard for equality among Blacks and Whites in the United States and a goal to be achieved. To quote Dr. King, “I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.” At a societal level, in an effort to eliminate racial discrimination, some countries (e.g., France) in their legal codes prohibit the collection of data that distinguishes origin, race, or religion.

Such efforts may seem well-justified and well-intended, not only because of the possibility of improved attitudes among members of the dominant group but also in terms of the immediate benefits of feeling included among members of disadvantaged groups. In this article, however, we consider other, less positive consequences of seemingly well-intentioned efforts to be inclusive of others. We argue that the benefits of inclusive policies for minority-group members, in terms of reducing explicit stereotyping and prejudice and enhancing their sense of belonging, are often significantly offset by the ways some forms of inclusive policies may perpetuate structural discrimination and reduce the likelihood that societies and organizations will profit from diversity.

In the next section, we review the dynamics of group identity and explain how changing the way people think about group memberships from separate groups to a members of the same group with shared identity improves intergroup attitudes and, on some levels, intergroup relations. In the section after that, we discuss the nature of the problem that such interventions are intended to address—contemporary bias and discrimination. Then, in the section that follows, we explain how and why majority and minority groups may have different preferences for recategorization and ultimately for associated policies to address disparity and discrimination. Here we explore the irony of harmony, illuminating how interventions that may promote more positive intergroup attitudes may, under some conditions, not only be ineffective for producing social change but may undermine actions by members of minority and of majority groups to engage in action for change. We also identify the qualities of interventions that can both improve intergroup attitudes and promote constructive action for change to achieve equality. In the concluding section, we consider the interpersonal, intergroup, and structural implications of these processes and how understanding these psychological dynamics can inform policies for achieving truly more equitable societies.
Dynamics of Group Identity: Benefits of Common Identity

Belonging to a group, particularly one that is high in status, provides enormous material and psychological benefits (Correll & Park, 2005; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

However, even at very basic levels of brain functioning (Molenberghs, 2013), belonging to a group also transforms the way people think about themselves and others. When people think of themselves in terms of their group identity, they perceive themselves and other ingroup members in terms of the group prototype—the “cognitive representation of features that describe and prescribe attributes of the group” (Hogg & Terry, 2000, p. 123)—and see themselves as interchangeable representatives of that prototype. Group prototypes emphasize similarities among ingroup members and accentuate differences between the ingroup and specific outgroups. Group needs and goals take precedence over personal needs and goals, and people automatically evaluate other members of their ingroup more positively, feel psychologically closer to them, and are more helpful, generous, and trusting toward them (Buttelmann & Böhm, 2014; see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010, for a review).

The psychological processes that are automatically activated when people believe that they share membership in the same group with others form the basis of the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000, 2012), a framework developed to reducing intergroup bias. This approach emphasizes the value of recategorization, the creation of a shared superordinate identity—an identity that applies to members of both groups that subsumes, and may often replace, their subgroup identities—for members of different groups.

The Common Ingroup Identity Model

The core idea of the common ingroup identity model is that factors that induce members of different groups to recategorize themselves as members of the same more inclusive group can reduce intergroup bias through cognitive and motivational processes involving ingroup favoritism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000, 2012). Recategorization changes the conceptual representations of the different groups from an “us” versus “them” orientation to a more encompassing, superordinate “we” connection. Creating a salient common identity thus harnesses the forces of ingroup bias that produce more positive beliefs, feelings and behaviors usually reserved for ingroup members, but now extends or redirects these forces toward former outgroup members because of their recategorized ingroup status.

A common ingroup identity may be achieved in a variety of ways, for example through positive intergroup contact or by changing the functional relationships between groups to one of cooperative interdependence to achieve a mutually desirable goal (as in the classic Robbers Cave studies by Sherif, Harvey, White,
Hood, & Sherif, 1961). Because people have multiple social identities, it is also possible to alter the ways people think about the groups. For example, effort to create common identity can increase the salience of existing shared superordinate memberships (e.g., a school, a company, a nation; Mottola, Bachman, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1997) or categories (e.g., students; Gómez, Dovidio, Huici, Gaertner, & Cuadrado, 2008), and deemphasize the identities that divide the groups (e.g., different units in a company, different districts within a city.

One of the first experiments testing hypotheses derived from the common ingroup identity model directly explored how both common identity and decategorization can both reduce intergroup bias but in different ways (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989). We compared the consequences of inducing two 3-person ad hoc laboratory groups of college students to regard themselves as one group, two groups, or separate individuals. To manipulate these representations, we systematically varied a number of elements of the contact situation, including the spatial arrangement of the members (i.e., integrated, segregated or separated seating patterns) and the nature of the interdependence among the participants.

As we predicted, participants in the condition that emphasized common ingroup identity (i.e., recategorization) and the condition that de-emphasized group memberships (i.e., decategorization) conditions reported less bias favoring the original ingroup over outgroup members relative to those in the condition that reinforced the different group identities. In addition, and as we hypothesized, participants in the One Group and Separate Individuals conditions reduced bias in different ways. In the One Group condition, bias was reduced primarily because evaluations of former outgroup members became more positive; in the Separate Individuals condition, evaluations of former ingroup members became less positive. Subsequently, employing procedures very similar to those used in Gaertner et al. (1989), Guerra et al. (2004, June) and Rebelo et al. (2004) obtained very similar patterns of findings among 9- and 10-year-old Black and White groups of children in Portugal.

Included among the different factors that can increase the perception of a common ingroup identity are the features specified by Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis, such as cooperative interdependence and common fate. For instance, inducing members of two different groups to cooperate improves attitudes toward outgroup members, as Sherif et al. (1961) demonstrated earlier, and does so, consistent with the common ingroup identity model, in large part by creating stronger feelings that they are now members of one group rather than members of two groups (Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990).

Early work on the common ingroup identity model demonstrated the applicability of the model to relations among a range of different groups in meaningful naturalistic contexts, including survey studies of students attending a multi-ethnic high school (Gaertner et al., 1996), banking executives who had experienced a corporate merger involving a wide variety of banks across the United States...
Dovidio et al. (Bachman, 1993), and college students who are members of blended families (Banker & Gaertner, 1998). In general, across these studies the more favorable participants reported the conditions of contact between the groups (e.g., cooperation), the more the school (or company or family) felt like one group. Supportive of the model, the more it felt like one group, the lower the bias in affective reactions in the high school, the less the intergroup anxiety among the banking executives, and the greater the amount of stepfamily harmony.

Experimental evidence in support of the model has demonstrated the robustness of the effects across different types of groups, including both laboratory and racial groups (e.g., Nier, Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, & Ward, 2001), across different national contexts, and addressing a range of diverse types of intergroup relations (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2012, for a review). For instance, in a medical setting in the United States, increasing the emphasis of common identity between the doctor and patient as a team with the shared goal of improving the patient’s health increased Black patients’ trust of their non-Black doctor. Greater patient trust, in turn, predicted subsequent adherence to the doctor’s medical recommendations (Penner et al., 2013). In Norway, stronger feelings of common ingroup identity with Muslims predicted less prejudice against Muslims and more support for Muslim immigrants, and in the US, manipulations that produced greater feelings of common identity also enhanced support for immigrants (Kunst, Thomsen, Sam, & Berry, 2015). Among children in Italy, imagining contact with an immigrant in a context evoking common identity produced positive orientations toward immigrants up to 2 weeks later (Vezzali et al., 2015).

The development of a common ingroup identity does not necessarily require each group to forsake its original, less inclusive group identity. Depending on their degree of identification with the different categories and contextual factors that make particular identities salient, individuals may activate two or more of their multiple social identities simultaneously (Roccas & Brewer, 2002) or sequentially (Turner, 1985). The common ingroup identity model recognizes the importance of a dual identity, in which people can conceive of two groups (e.g., science and art majors) as distinct units within the context of a superordinate social entity (e.g., university students).

**Group Identity and Acculturation Ideologies**

Although work on the common ingroup identity model has focused primarily on the ways members of different groups think and feel about each other, it also may form the basis of general cultural ideologies. In his classic acculturation framework, Berry (1997, 2001; see also Sam & Berry, 2010) presents four forms of cultural relations in pluralistic societies that represent the intersection of “yes–no” responses to two relevant questions: (1) Are cultural identity and customs of value to be retained? (2) Are positive relations with the larger society of
value, and to be sought? These combinations reflect four adaptation strategies for intergroup relations: (1) integration, when cultural identities are retained and positive relations with the larger society are sought; (2) separatism, when cultural identities are retained but positive relations with the larger society are not sought; (3) assimilation, when cultural identities are abandoned and positive relations with the larger society are desired; and (4) marginalization, when cultural identities are abandoned and are not replaced by positive identification with the larger society.

Although this framework has been applied primarily to the ways in which immigrants acclimate to a new society, it can be adapted to apply to intergroup relations generally (see Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007; see also Hewstone, Turner, Kenworthy, & Crisp, 2006). As illustrated in Figure 1, substituting the separate strengths of the subgroup and subordinate group identities for the answers to Berry’s (1997) two questions, the combinations can be mapped onto the four main representations considered in the Common Ingroup Identity Model: (1) dual identity (subgroup and superordinate group identities are high, like integration); (2) different groups (subgroup identity is high and superordinate identity is low, like separatism); (3) one group (subgroup identity is low and superordinate group identity is high, like assimilation; and (4) separate individuals (subgroup and superordinate group identities are low, like marginalization).

Among the four acculturation ideologies, assimilation, which involves solely the common identity, and integration in terms of multiculturalism, which reflects a dual identity have received the most attention in the psychological study of intergroup relations (Wolsko, Park, & Judd, 2006). Both of these ideologies emphasize common identity but assimilation requires that minority-group members abandon

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**Superordinate Group Identity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decategorization</td>
<td>Recategorization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate Individuals</td>
<td>One Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meritocracy</td>
<td>Assimilation</td>
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<td>Colorblind</td>
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<tr>
<td>Categorization</td>
<td>Recategorization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Separate Groups</td>
<td>Same Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>Separatism</td>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
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</tbody>
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**Fig. 1.** The relationship between different representations within the common ingroup identity model, and acculturation ideologies and beliefs.
racial or ethnic subgroup identities and associated values, whereas multiculturalism recognizes subgroup identities and often celebrates distinctive contributions rooted in these identities to a common good (Verkuyten, 2006).

Recategorization within a common ingroup identity, both in terms of substituting separate group identities with a common ingroup identity (related to assimilation) or creating dual identities (reflecting multiculturalism), can produce more positive intergroup attitudes (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2009; Gaertner, Dovidio, Guerra, Hehman, & Saguy, 2016, for a review). However, in the remainder of this article, we illustrate how there can be a “darker side” of intergroup harmony achieved solely by emphasizing common identity (and the related cultural ideologies of colorblindness and assimilation), particularly compared to a dual identity (and the related cultural ideology of multiculturalism). We explain how these processes are reflected in general cultural ideologies, such as colorblindness (an expression of common identity) and multiculturalism (related to a dual identity), as well as policies based on those principles.

We further propose that recategorization in the form of a single common ingroup identity (vs. a dual identity) may be a strategy employed by majority-group members in the short-run to reduce the personal concerns in intergroup relations, focusing on Black-White relations in the United States as an example, but which in the long-run reinforce the status quo in ways that benefit the majority group and perpetuate disadvantage of minority groups.

The Subtlety of Contemporary Bias

In 1970, Kovel distinguished between two forms of racism: dominative and aversive. Dominative racism is the “old-fashioned,” blatant form. According to Kovel, the dominative racist is the “type who acts out bigoted beliefs—he [sic] represents the open flame of racial hatred” (p. 54). Building on Kovel’s (1970) distinction, over the past 45 years we have explored the existence and operation of aversive racism among White Americans.

Aversive Racism

Aversive racism is hypothesized to be qualitatively different than blatant, “old-fashioned” racism. Aversive racists sympathize with victims of past injustice, support principles of racial equality, and genuinely regard themselves as nonprejudiced, but at the same time possess conflicting, often nonconscious, negative feelings and beliefs about Blacks, and which are rooted in basic psychological processes (e.g., social categorization) that promote racial bias (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Pearson, 2016; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Pearson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2009). In addition, the negative feelings that aversive racists have toward Blacks do not reflect open hostility or hatred. Instead,
aversive racists’ reactions typically involve discomfort, anxiety, or fear. That is, while they find Blacks “aversive,” they find any suggestion that they might be prejudiced “aversive” as well. In addition, in some instances aversive racism can reflect the expression of more positive feelings toward Blacks than toward whites (Gaertner et al., 1997; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). The experience of differential positivity rather than negativity toward racial ingroup and outgroup members similarly can obscure self-recognition of prejudicial attitudes.

One of the current challenges for reducing barriers to discrimination that disadvantages a range of different minority groups is the subtle way contemporary bias operates in societies with core egalitarian values. For example, in the United States expressed attitudes toward women and Black Americans have become dramatically more positive over time (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). Traditional stereotypes of both groups appear to be rapidly fading, at least based on people’s overt beliefs. The vast majority of White Americans perceive that the United States is currently characterized by racial and gender equality, deny any personal bias, and in fact assert their ability to remain color- and gender-blind in their interactions and decisions.

Nevertheless, as suggested by the aversive racism framework, unconscious negative racial attitudes, which elicit subtle forms of discrimination, are still prevalent. Measures of implicit bias—such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009) demonstrate that negative racial attitudes and racial and gender stereotypes are automatically activated for a majority of Americans (Blair, 2001), regardless of age, socioeconomic status, and political orientation. Self-report and implicit measures of stereotyping and prejudice are largely uncorrelated (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002) and reveal that most White Americans are characterized by a pattern representing aversive racism: possessing conscious nonprejudiced attitudes by unconscious negative racial attitudes. This dissociation between explicit attitudes and beliefs, which are inclusive and egalitarian, and pervasive implicit biases and negative stereotypes leads to contemporary forms of discrimination.

**Subtle Discrimination**

Contemporary biases are elusive but powerful phenomena. In situations in which right or wrong is clearly defined or the appropriate course of behavior is obvious, people are unlikely to behave in a sexist or racist manner; to discriminate in these situations would be obvious and would violate personal egalitarian principles. However, in situations in which right and wrong is not clearly defined, appropriate behavior is not obvious, or a negative response could be justified on the basis of some factor other than race or sex, bias will be expressed in a subtle manner that insulates the perpetrator from being recognized—by others or even oneself—as representing unfair treatment (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004).
For example, Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) examined White college students’ support for hiring Black and White applicants for a selective campus position within the same college in the years 1989 and 1999. When the candidates’ credentials clearly qualified or disqualified them for the position (very strong and weak qualification conditions), there was no discrimination against the Black candidate (i.e., the highly qualified Black candidate was just as likely to be hired as the highly qualified White candidate). However, when candidates’ qualifications for the position were less obvious and the appropriate decision was more ambiguous (moderate qualifications), White participants recommended the Black candidate significantly less often than the White candidate with exactly the same credentials. Whereas overt expressions of prejudice (measured by items on a self-report scale for each sample) declined over this 10-year period, the pattern of subtle discrimination in selection decisions remained essentially unchanged. This pattern was conceptually replicated in research with human resource professionals in Puerto Rico (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2007). Son Hing, Chung-Yan, Hamilton, and Zanna (2008) found a similar pattern of bias against Asian job applicants in Canada, further demonstrating that participants with greater anti-Asian implicit bias (measured using the IAT) were more likely to discriminate against the Asian applicant when credentials were mixed (but not when Asian candidates were impeccably qualified).

Additional research offers further insight into processes that underlie these effects. When ambiguous or mixed credentials are involved, people systematically weigh credentials differently based on their unconscious biases. For example, when providing input to college admission decisions for candidates with mixed credentials (e.g., strong high school grades but modest standardized scores, or vice versa), White college students emphasized the credential that White candidates were stronger in relative to Black candidates as being the more valid predictor of success in college. This differential weighting of the credentials, in turn, justified students’ stronger recommendations of White than Black candidates for admission (Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2002; see also Brief, Dietz, Cohen, Pugh, & Vaslow, 2000).

Although the nature of the target group varies across cultures based on historical and contemporary factors, the principles of aversive racism are applicable to behaviors of dominant groups toward minorities in other nations that also have strong societal egalitarian values. Experiments conducted in Canada (Son Hing et al., 2008), England (Hodson, Hooper, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2005), the Netherlands (Kleinpenning & Hagendoorn, 1993), Portugal (de França & Monteiro, 2013), and Spain (Wojcieszak, 2015) have revealed convergent evidence that reveal patterns of subtle discrimination supportive of the aversive racism framework.

The existence and potential pervasiveness of subtle bias, even among segments of the population that generally seem liberal and well-intentioned, have broad social implications. One problem is that fairness must be practiced uniformly
to produce fair outcomes. If a person or a system is fair 90% of the time but systematically biased 10% of the time, inequitable outcomes result. Even small biases will produce large unfair disparities due to their cumulative effect, either affecting many people simultaneously or shaping the outcome of particular individuals repeatedly over time (Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2015; Martell, Lane, & Emrich, 1996). Closing the gate to advancement at one point closes the gates at all subsequent points.

Colorblind Ideology, Aversive Racism, and Common Identity

Although there may be many factors (e.g., cultural or socialization influences) that lead people to adopt a colorblind ideology, this ideology may be particularly appealing to aversive racists. A colorblind ideology can help an aversive racist maintain an egalitarian self-image and avoid attributions of racial bias for negative responses to a Black person, because this perspective denies race as basis for one’s actions. Consistent with this reasoning, most Whites are motivated to avoid seeing themselves as racially biased and often adopt a colorblind strategy when engaging in interracial interactions, particularly when they anticipate racial tension (Apfelbaum, Norton, & Sommers, 2012). However, efforts to be colorblind can sometimes produce rebound effects, causing individuals who attempt to be colorblind to activate implicit biases even more strongly (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). In addition, Uhlmann and Cohen (2005) found that participants who were more confident in the objectivity of their judgments were also more likely to discriminate against equally qualified female candidates for a stereotypically male job (chief of police), inflating criteria that favored male over female candidates. Ironically, the act of affirming a nonprejudiced self-image can further increase the likelihood that even ostensibly nonprejudiced individuals will discriminate (see also Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009; Monin & Miller, 2001).

At an institutional level, a dominant colorblind ideology exerts a cultural influence that can affect the thoughts and actions of minority-group members, as well as majority-group members, in ways that perpetuate disadvantage. Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich (2011) observed that “the ideology of color-blindness is increasingly affecting even those who are at or near the bottom of the economic and social hierarchies in the United States: blacks and Latinos” (p. 195). Bonilla-Silva’s (2003) structural approach (see also Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich, 2011) emphasizes the role of policies and cultural standards, independent of the intentions or actions of a given individual, for perpetuating group hierarchy. A social psychological approach, which emphasizes the processes within and between individuals, offers a complementary perspective. Specifically, social psychological research has revealed a tendency to perceive prevailing hierarchies and disparities as what “should” be (Kay et al., 2009), as well as a general motivation to preserve the
status quo, even at a high cost to one’s group (see system justification theory; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2013).

One way of promoting a colorblind perspective is by creating or emphasizing a sense of common identity between majority- and minority-group members. This process can deflect attention away from group-based disparities, reducing the likelihood that members of high status groups perceive social injustice, and promote a feeling of harmony and optimism that undermines collective action by members of low status groups. In the next two sections we examine (1) differences in preferences of members of high status and low status groups for different representations (one group or dual identity) and associated cultural ideologies (colorblind or multicultural) and (2) how a one-group representation and dual identity can both improve attitudes but have different effects on action to achieve social equality.

**Strategic Preferences for Identity: Majority and Minority Groups**

While fully acknowledging the benefits of recategorization for producing more positive intergroup attitudes, as we noted earlier, there may be another “dark side,” with longer-term consequences, of intergroup harmony achieved through recategorization in terms of a common ingroup identity. We propose that recategorization in the form of common ingroup identity may be a strategy employed, possibly consciously but possibly not, by members of majority-group members to reinforce the status quo that benefits their group. Indeed, Wright and Lubensky (2009) identified the goals of prejudice reduction strategies generally, which align closely with the principles of the common ingroup identity model, and juxtaposed them with the factors that promote social action. Strategies for reducing prejudice are most effective when they deemphasize subgroup identification, reduce the salience of group-based inequality, and emphasize commonalities between the groups. In contrast, conditions that facilitate collective action to ameliorate structural inequality focus attention on subgroup identities, increase the salience of group disparities, and portray the other group in negative ways. Wright and Lubensky’s analysis reveals a potential dynamic tension between improving intergroup attitudes and facilitating action to achieve true equality.

Whereas commonality and colorblindness help establish the conditions that reduce prejudice and promote intergroup harmony (often without addressing structural inequalities), maintaining group distinctiveness while emphasizing unfair disparities is critical for motivating action to address structural inequity. Moreover, when the goal is to reduce the resistance of members of another group to give up some advantage to achieve equity or even recruit members of that group to actively engage in actions for equality, recognizing group difference and disadvantage in the context of a larger overarching connection between the groups is critical. For relations and transactions within one’s group, people focus primarily
on the fairness of the processes that lead to outcomes (or procedural justice). For relations and transactions between different groups, people are more concerned about the outcomes for the self and for one’s group than about the process that leads to these outcomes (Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Blader, 2003). This emphasis on distinct subgroup identities while recognizing a superordinate identity for members of the different groups represents the construct of a dual identity in the common ingroup identity model and, relatedly, an essential element of a multicultural identity.

In the remainder of this section, we consider the different preferences for identity of members of the majority group, who tend to be strongly motivated to maintain their group’s privileged status (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and for members of minority groups, who are motivated to enhance their group’s position and achieve group equality.

**Identity Preferences**

Members of the majority group are likely to prefer a common, one-group identity (which is associated with a cultural ideology of assimilation and color-blindness; Berry, 1997; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000) for two reasons. First, this orientation is functional when generally adopted in the society because the superordinate group identity typically reflects the characteristics, norms, and values of the majority group (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007). Second, focusing only on this shared identity distracts attention away from the advantages enjoyed by the majority group relative to other subgroups (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009).

By contrast, members of minority groups may generally prefer a dual identity representation (Dovidio et al., 2007; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009). A dual identity representation, which is related to a multicultural ideology, recognizes valued subgroup identities and common connection between groups, which communicates respect for minority-group members (Bergsieker, Shelton, & Richeson, 2010; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009) and promotes sensitivity to unfair treatment of members of minority groups within the superordinate identity (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013). Thus, while members of majority groups tend to obscure differences between groups, members of minority groups tend to stress both commonalities and differences between groups.

Consistent with this reasoning, research in the area of immigration suggests that immigrant groups and majority groups have different preferences for assimilation and multicultural integration. Van Oudenhoven, Prins, and Buunk (1998) found in the Netherlands that Dutch majority-group members preferred an assimilation of minority groups (in which minority group identity was abandoned and replaced by identification with the dominant Dutch culture), whereas Turkish and Moroccan immigrants most strongly endorsed integration (in which they would retain their own cultural identity while also valuing the dominant Dutch
culture). Verkuyten (2006; see also Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012) summarized the results of eight studies of adolescents and young adults in Europe, consistently finding that minority-group members supported multiculturalism (integration) more than did majority-group members. These different orientations apply to the preferences of Whites and racial and ethnic minorities in the United States, as well Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kafati, 2000; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007). Whites most prefer assimilation, more strongly endorsing positions such as, “recognizing that all people are basically the same regardless of their ethnicity”; whereas racial and ethnic minorities favor multiculturalism, more strongly supporting statements about “the importance of appreciating group differences between ethnic groups” (Ryan et al., 2007).

Strategic Intergroup Behavior

In intergroup interactions, members of advantaged and disadvantaged groups are motivated to shape the discourse in ways that emphasize their preferred representation. In a pair of studies, one with laboratory groups varying in control over a valued resource (extra credit for experimental participation) and the other with ethnic groups varying in status in Israel (Ashkenazim, high status; Mizrahi, low status), we (Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008) hypothesized that whereas members of advantaged groups would prefer discourse that focuses virtually exclusively on commonality, members of disadvantaged groups would be more balanced in their preference to discuss group differences and commonalities (the two critical elements of a dual identity). Across both studies, members of advantaged and disadvantaged groups showed an equivalently strong interest in discussing topics of commonality. However, members of advantaged groups exhibited significantly less interest than did members of disadvantaged groups in discussing differences between the groups. Members of disadvantaged groups showed equivalently strong preferences for talking about commonality and difference. Moreover, the effect of group status on desire to talk about differences between the groups was mediated by motivation for changing group positions toward equality. That is, disadvantaged-group members’ greater preference to discuss points of difference, relative to advantaged-group members, occurred because they had a greater motivation for a change in the power structure.

The strategic nature of these preferences is suggested by two other sets of findings. The studies demonstrate that context matters. First, in the United States, we (Hehman et al., 2012) studied the preferences of Whites and Blacks at two public institutions, one a state college in which Whites represent the majority (85%) of the student body and the other a historically Black college in which Blacks are the majority (76%). As illustrated in Table 1, contextual status affects preferences. White students showed a much stronger preference for multicultural-
Table 1. Preferences for Assimilation and Multiculturalism on Campus Expressed by White and Black students at a Predominantly White College and a Historically Black College

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference for</th>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominantly White College</td>
<td>5.20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historically Black College</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>5.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>5.81</td>
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<td>Historically Black College</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>5.31</td>
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</table>

ism when they were in the minority than in the majority; Black students exhibited stronger endorsement of assimilation when they were the majority.

One possible implication of this analysis is that when the status quo becomes unstable, the group-based preferences for certain forms of intergroup relations will intensify. Exploring this possibility, we examined students’ preferences for university policies three times over an academic year (Dovidio et al., 2007). The first time was at the beginning of the semester, when race relations were perceived to be relatively positive and stable. The second time was near the end of the first semester after a series of racial incidents threatening Blacks (e.g., racial graffiti on campus, several alleged episodes of verbal harassment of Black students). The third time was in the middle of the second semester, when race relations were perceived to be less tense and volatile.

Across these three time periods, we assessed, longitudinally, White and Black students’ support for policies that reflected efforts associated with one group (assimilationist), dual identity (multicultural integrationalist), and separate groups (separatist) initiatives. These policies, which were developed through pilot testing, were not directly related to the racial incidents that occurred. Examples of one-group policies were, “The university should devote more funds to common activities for all students,” and “Students in their first year should be assigned roommates on a random basis.” Examples of dual identity policies were, “The university should devote more funds to multicultural activities on campus,” and “Minority students may choose to have a roommate of their same race or ethnicity in their first year, but there should not be separate minority dormitories.” Separatist policies were, “The university should devote more money to activities to groups to support their different racial or ethnic identities,” and “Minority students should be allowed to have their own dormitory.”

As revealed in Figure 2, even before the racial incidents occurred, majority and minority students showed differential support for one group, dual identity, and separate-group policies. Consistent with the findings reported earlier, Whites
exhibited a stronger preference for one-group policies than did minority-group students. Minority students showed a stronger preference for dual identity policies. For both Whites and minorities, separatist policies were least supported, and there were no differences between the groups in level of support for separatism. During the second measurement period, when racial tensions were high, these racial differences in support for one group and dual identity policies were significantly magnified, and Blacks more strongly supported separate-group policies than did Whites and at a level somewhat higher than their support for one group initiatives. By the third assessment period, when racial tensions had substantially subsided, the pattern of policy preferences approached what it was at the beginning of the year. Whether the different policy-related responses of majority and minority students were conscious strategies or an unconscious reaction to the events is unclear from these data. Nevertheless, the overall pattern is consistent with our hypothesized difference in the goals of the groups.

In general, these studies converge to reveal that hierarchical relations between groups systematically lead to different contact preferences and strategies for members of advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Members of advantaged groups, who are motivated to maintain the status quo, show a preference for focusing on commonalities to the exclusion of differences. Members of disadvantaged groups, who desire to alter the status quo to improve their group’s hierarchical position, from which they derive a sense of personal esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), exhibit

Fig. 2. Preference for assimilationist, multicultural, and separatist policies among White and Black students as a function of campus climate over time (Dovidio & Kafati, 2003).
a greater desire to talk about differences between the groups but, at the same time, to discuss commonalities between the groups.

Thus far we have discussed the different motivations, intentions, and potential strategies of members of advantaged and disadvantaged groups. The question we next consider is the critical one—Do these different strategies actually produce different outcomes? The next section presents research that answers this question.

The Irony of Harmony

To the extent to which emphasizing common identity or, at a structural level, colorblindness or assimilation, reduces attention to structural inequality as it promotes positive attitudes toward members of the outgroup (see also Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010), it can have consequences for group members’ expectations regarding intergroup relations and hierarchy. Specifically, such outcomes may inflate perceptions of the fairness of the advantaged group among disadvantaged-group members and thus produce optimism about prospects of equality and relax their motivation to take direct action for social change.

We conducted three studies that explored these implications (Saguy et al., 2009). The first study experimentally examined the causal effect of a commonality-focused encounter, relative to a difference-focused interaction, on disadvantaged-group members’ outgroup attitudes, attention to inequality, and expectations of outgroup fairness, as well as on advantaged-group members’ intergroup orientations and resource allocation. The second and third studies generalized and extended the findings, specifically with respect to disadvantaged groups, by examining the relation of positive intergroup contact to attitudes, perceptions of inequality and outgroup fairness, and support for social change in two naturalistic intergroup contexts.

The laboratory study (Saguy et al., 2009, Study 1) manipulated power between two randomly assigned groups by giving the advantaged group the position of assigning extra course credits to the two groups (see also Saguy et al., 2008). Before the members of the advantaged group allocated the credits, members of both groups interacted with instructions to focus on either intergroup commonalities or differences.

As expected, commonality-focused interaction produced more positive intergroup attitudes for both advantaged- and disadvantaged-group members than did difference-focused contact. In addition, for both groups, attention to inequality between groups was lower in the commonality-focused condition. Moreover, members of the disadvantaged group expected the advantaged group to be fairer in allocating the resources and to distribute the credits in a more equitable fashion following commonality-focused, rather than differences-focused, interaction. These effects were mediated by more positive intergroup attitudes and decreased attention to inequity during the interaction.
Fig. 3. Disadvantaged-group members expect more resources after talking about commonality than differences, but advantaged-group members favor their own group with resources regardless of the nature of the intergroup interaction (Saguy et al., 2009).

However, when the disadvantaged-group members’ expectations were compared to the advantaged group’s actual allocation, there was a significant discrepancy (see Figure 3). As the members of the disadvantaged groups anticipated, advantaged groups were substantially biased against the disadvantaged groups in the allocation of credits after differences-focused contact but, unexpectedly from the perspective of disadvantaged-group members, advantaged groups were just as biased in allocating the credits after commonality-focused interaction. The more positive intergroup attitudes of advantaged-group members in the commonality-focused, versus differences-focused, condition did not translate into more material support to achieve equality, and the advantaged groups’ allocation fell significantly below what disadvantaged groups anticipated.

The other two studies in this set examined these processes in two different cultural contexts. In the study of Arabs in Israel (Saguy et al., 2009, Study 2), we examined the statistical associations among positive contact with Israeli Jews (which likely involves a focus on commonalities; Aron et al., 2004), attitudes toward Israeli Jews, awareness of inequality, and perceptions of Israeli Jews as fair. We further measured Israeli Arabs’ support for social change toward equality. We hypothesized that such factors would relate to weaker support for social action for change among Israeli Arabs. Moreover, we expected this weaker support for social action would occur because Israeli Arabs with more positive contact with Israeli Jews would (1) attend less to illegitimate aspects in the inequality and positive outgroup orientations may undermine both the mobilization of disadvantaged-group members toward social action (Simon & Klandermans,
2001), and (2) more strongly that progress would made by the actions of the outgroup (Israeli Jews) to be fair.

Consistent with the results of our laboratory experiment, more positive contact with Israeli Jews was associated with more positive attitudes toward Israeli Jews and with reduced awareness of inequality between Israeli Jews and Arabs. In addition, improved attitudes were associated with increased perceptions of Israeli Jews as fair. Moreover, and consistent with our theorizing, both perceptions of Israeli Jews as fair and reduced awareness of inequality were associated with reduced support for social change. Thus, through its effects on the way minority-group members viewed social inequality and members of the other group, contact was associated with a decrease in support for social change.

Results of a study in India, where Muslims are a salient minority group and Hindus are the majority group, replicated these findings (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, Pratto, & Singh, 2011). For Muslims, having more Hindu friends was related to the improved attitudes of Muslims toward Hindus, but it also reduced awareness of inequality between Muslims and Hindus. In addition, these outcomes predicted stronger perceptions of Hindus as fair, which in turn were related to weaker collective action tendencies (measured as intentions to participate in various actions that could improve the position of Muslims in India). In addition, Russian immigrants to Finland who had a stronger Finnish national identity were less supportive of their immigrant community’s collective action, in part because they believe that personal mobility into the larger society was more possible (Måhönen & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2015).

Common Identity, Subtle Bias, and Collective Action by Minority-Group Members

The subtlety of contemporary bias makes it particularly likely that unfair disadvantage will be overlooked or dismissed when there is a focus on common identity (or, relatedly, assimilation or colorblindness). Focusing on only common identity distracts attention against group-based disparities, and potential inequities, based on separate subgroup identities, and even when detected can reduce motivation to take action because of greater trust in the system among minority-group members (e.g., Kay et al., 2009). Thus, common identity may particularly undermine collective action by disadvantaged-group members and interventions by advantaged-group members on behalf of minority groups when the operation of bias is ambiguous.

We (Ufkes, Dovidio, & Tel, 2015) directly tested these hypotheses in the context of Kurds in Europe and racial and ethnic minorities in the United States. Kurds are an ethnic group of Middle-Eastern origin that have had rapidly increasing immigration rates in Europe, and they are one of the most politically active migrant groups in Europe, engaging in hunger strikes and demonstrations, sometimes
erupting into violence. Specifically, we investigated the possible moderating role of different types of disadvantage (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008, for an overview). Incidental disadvantage, which involves a suddenly imposed change of the status quo, tends to be highly salient and readily recognized as arbitrary or unfair (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Structural disadvantage, by contrast, refers to a status quo of inequality. When the relative status of groups is perceived to be secure or stable—that is, in situations of structural inequality—causes of subordinate status may be more open to interpretation (see Banfield & Dovidio, 2013). Under such conditions, it is even more likely that members of disadvantaged groups are susceptible to the effects of system-justifying ideologies and come to believe that their group actually deserves fewer resources and opportunities than members of the advantaged group (Becker & Wright, 2011; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Ni Sullivan, 2003).

In this study, structural disadvantage was represented by reference to general policies denying Kurdish identity in Europe; incidental disadvantage was portrayed by a specific incident representing the denial of Kurdish identity, the banning of a Kurdish television station. Before the manipulation of the type of disadvantage, we measured strength of identification with both the subgroup (Kurds) and the common ingroup (Europe). As predicted, when structural disadvantage—which is open to various interpretations and justifications—was emphasized, Kurdish participants who identified more strongly with Europe (common identity) were less motivated to engage in collective action to achieve equality; when discrimination was incidental, and thus clearer, Kurdish participants who identified more strongly with Europe (common identity) were somewhat (but not significantly) more motivated to engage in collective action. Taken together, these findings support our hypothesis that stronger identification with a common superordinate identity can reduce the responsiveness of minority-group members to less obvious forms of bias—an effect consistent with the hypothesized irony of harmony.

Ufkes, Calcagno, Glasford, and Dovidio (2016) conducted two additional studies focusing on the structural disadvantage of racial/ethnic minorities in the US, which varied the emphasis on their common (US) identity with Whites, their separate subgroup (racial/ethnic identity), or their dual identity (Black-American or Latino-American identity) in a newspaper article that they first read. These participants then saw a description of a political movement (the “New Civil Rights Initiative”) to ban affirmative action that benefited their group educationally and economically. In the first study in this set, the two key pathways to collective action identified by Van Zomeren et al. (2008) were assessed: feelings of anger (associated with perceived injustice) and collective efficacy (beliefs that collective action will produce change). Emphasizing common identity uniquely led to low levels of anger and lower perceptions that collective action by their minority group would effectively accomplish change. Both of the perceptions, in turn, predicted
lower motivation to engage in collective action to oppose the New Civil Rights Initiative.

The second study in this set also attempted to integrate the work of Van Zomeren et al. (2008), who emphasized the dual pathways of anger and collective efficacy for collective action, and of Saguy et al. (2009, 2011), who focused on attention to group-based inequities as a critical determinant of action for change. Because a strong sense of common ingroup identity in some forms reduces the salience of subgroup identities, which distinguish disadvantaged groups from the advantaged group, emphasizing intergroup commonalities may distract attention away from group-based inequality in general (Jasko & Kossowska, 2013). When common identity is strong and the disadvantaged-group distinct identity is less salient, members of disadvantaged groups may be less likely to identify specific actions as forms of group-based bias, which reduces angry reactions to the event, as well as the belief that their group would be efficacious in changing the status quo (that is, collective efficacy). As a consequence of less anger and weaker sense of collective efficacy, members of disadvantaged groups would be less likely to pursue collective action in response to an incident of potential injustice.

The results supported the hypothesis. Participants for whom common identity as Americans was emphasized perceived less group-based inequality in society than did participants for whom a dual identity (separate racial/ethnic identity and common identity as Americans) or separate racial/ethnic identities only were emphasized in the materials that they read. Lower levels of perceived group-based inequality, in turn, predicted less anger and a weaker perception of collective efficacy, and these pathways both predicted less commitment to opposing the political movement to eliminate affirmative action.

Social change toward equality depends not only on the actions of members of disadvantaged group but also involves the support and potential initiative of members of advantaged groups. In the next section, we consider the role of majority-group members in intervening to benefit minority groups and the conditions that may inhibit or facilitate such action.

Common Identity, Subtle Bias, and Collective Action by Majority-Group Members

Although collective action by minority-group members can achieve significant social change, such action by majority-group members may be even more effective because of the greater resources they possess and the potential of facing less resistance from other majority-group members for attempts to benefit the minority group. Indeed, when members of advantaged groups recognize that the disadvantage of minority groups is unfair, they are genuinely motivated to restore equity (Saguy et al., 2008). However, as we noted earlier, the subtle nature of contemporary bias typically limits their recognition of unfair bias. Subtle bias is
more difficult to detect and respond to than blatant bias even for minority-group members (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009), and majority-group members are less attuned to cues of subtle discrimination than are minority-group members (Salvatore & Shelton, 2007). Thus, focusing on commonalities between groups, as suggested by the common ingroup identity model, may decrease the likelihood that majority-group members will recognize and respond to injustice, particularly in the form of subtle bias, against minority-group members (see Saguy & Chernyak-Hai, 2012).

Banfield and Dovidio (2013, Experiment 1) examined this issue in a study in which White participants in the US, varying in levels of prejudice, were exposed to a manipulation that emphasized common-group (American) identity of Blacks and Whites, separate racial-group memberships, or a control condition that did not emphasize identities. Participants then read a hiring scenario that involved either subtle or blatant discrimination, in which a Black candidate was not offered a job. The outcomes of interest were perceptions of discrimination and expressions of willingness to protest on behalf of the applicant who was denied the job.

As expected, when the bias witnessed was subtle, White participants for whom common identity was emphasized perceived lower levels of bias than those for whom separate identities were emphasized or those in a control condition, and these perceptions mediated less willingness to protest the negative outcome for Black person who was disadvantaged. By contrast, when discrimination was blatant, emphasizing common identity produced somewhat greater perceptions of bias and somewhat more willingness to engage in collective action.

Taken together, there is consistent and convergent evidence that (1) majority-group members prefer emphasis solely on common identity while minority-group members value a dual identity; (2) that these different preferences may be strategic—albeit not necessarily consciously so—to promote the different group interests to maintain (for majority groups) or alter (for minority groups) the status quo; and (3) emphasizing only common identity obscures recognition of group-based disparities and undermines the motivation both of minority-group and majority-group members to engage in social action to promote structural equality.

Intervening to Improve Attitudes and Promote Action

Thus far, we have described the problem with common identity and its associated phenomena of assimilation and colorblindness. Although both majority and minority groups seem to desire a society that is inclusive, thinking only in terms of common identity obscures group-based disparities, creating unstable intergroup relations—seemingly harmonious but one in which neither group addresses unfair inequalities. In this section we discuss both the pitfalls and the promise of interventions to improve intergroup relations both interpersonally and structurally.
Subtle Bias, Common Identity, and the Darker Side of “We”  

**Colorblindness, Common Identity, and the Suppression of Difference**

When automatically activated social categories, such as race in the US, are involved, attempts to be colorblind require cognitive effort to suppress the recognition of race, which can negatively affect the quality and outcomes of interracial interactions. The cognitive demands of suppressing the activation of difference can create communication dysfluencies, such as hesitations and reduced responsiveness, which have particularly detrimental effects on rapport between members of social groups (Pearson et al., 2008) and may readily be attributed to intergroup bias (Pearson & Dovidio, 2014).

Furthermore, when Whites attempt to be colorblind, they tend to be self-focused and more oriented toward monitoring their own performance than toward learning about the particular needs and concerns of the Black person with whom they are interacting. Concerns about how well one is “performing” and how one is perceived by other people in interracial interactions may impair the ability of people (particularly less explicitly prejudiced individuals) to engage in intimacy-building behaviors. For example, Vorauer, Gagnon, and Sasaki (2009) found that when participants in interracial interactions adopted a colorblind orientation they were less positive, supportive, and other-oriented than when they adopted a multicultural orientation that acknowledged differences between them and the Black participants in the interaction. According to Vorauer et al., attempting to be colorblind led people in these exchanges to avoid topics that would bring to light meaningful differences between them. Instead, they displayed a cautious preventive focus, in which one is primarily concerned with avoiding negative outcomes rather than achieving positive ones (i.e., a promotion focus). By contrast, a multicultural perspective involves the appreciation of differences and of common connections, and encourages a promotion-oriented focus.

The kind of inclusiveness associated with an emphasis on only common identity, on colorblindness, or on assimilation also does not guarantee fair treatment and may, in fact, contribute to the perpetuation of unfair treatment of women and racial/ethnic minorities. To the extent that the superordinate identity is defined by the standards and attributes of the dominant group, which it typically the case (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), members of nondominant groups included within that identity are vulnerable to being perceived as deviant (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004) or allowing their subgroup identity to become invisible, not only to others but for themselves. Thus, they may experience immediate benefits of being able to “pass,” increasing their personal chances of success but at the sacrifice of the psychological buffering effects of subgroup identity (Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes, & Garcia, 2014) and social support from other members of their subgroup (Hagiwara, Penner, Gonzalez, & Albrecht, 2013).

Therefore, while commonality may represent a valuable step toward reducing intergroup tensions and developing trust and intimacy between members of
different groups, it is not a panacea. Successfully addressing group-based disparities requires being conscious of subgroup identities, as well.

**Diversity within Common Identity**

As noted earlier, creating a common identity does not require groups to forsake subgroup identities. Both common and subgroup identities can be salient simultaneously (i.e., a dual identity). The acknowledgement of identities permits recognition of group-based disparities and differences, while a common, inclusive identity promotes the positive connection to view differences as complementary resources and unfair disparities as a threat to the integrity of the larger group, motivating both dominant and nondominant group members to restore justice (Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Blader, 2003).

From the perspective of members of minority-group members emphasizing that their subgroup identity is recognized as an element of common identity (a combination reflecting multiculturalism) communicates greater respect to them than focusing only on shared identity. These feelings or respect and belonging within the common identity then can improve intergroup attitudes (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2015) and may facilitate willingness to take action for change (Simon, Reichert, & Grabow, 2013; Simon & Ruhs, 2008), because this form of inclusion implies greater support for equality among members the majority group (Whites) and thus optimism about the prospects for social change (Glasford & Dovidio, 2011).

With respect to majority-group members, emphasizing dual identity representations—the importance of different racial and ethnic groups within a common national identity—can facilitate not only greater recognition of bias than does a common ingroup identity (which de-emphasizes subgroup identities and obscures subgroup disparities) but also produce greater motivation to act on behalf of disadvantaged-group members. As mentioned previously, people are particularly sensitive to violations of procedural justice and perceptions of unfairness within their own group, and they are often willing to give up resources to restore equity within the group. Within a dual identity, salient subgroup identities facilitate the detection of bias and common connection through shared identity mobilizes people to address these inequities.

One of the challenges for intergroup relations is that, as reviewed in an earlier section, members of advantaged and disadvantaged groups typically prefer different representations and ideologies: Members of advantaged groups typically prefer a single common identity, colorblindness, and assimilation; members of disadvantaged groups generally prefer a dual identity, multiculturalism, and integration. This discordance in preferred identity representation preferences and acculturation ideologies between members of the host society and immigrant groups, in itself, can produce negative intergroup outcomes. According to the
Interactive Acculturation Model (Bourhis, Montreuil, Barrette, & Montaruli 2009), immigrants’ adjustment is better and intergroup relations less strained when acculturation ideologies of members of the host society and of immigrants converge (see also Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009; Pfafferott & Brown, 2006; Zagefka & Brown, 2002).

Motivation, Colorblindness, and Multiculturalism

Although greater convergence may generally improve attitudes, we propose that whether the convergence in preference is for common or dual identity can further influence the basic motivations experienced in intergroup relations. When there is a mutual focus on dual identity or multiculturalism, group differences are acknowledged and potentially valued. By contrast, a mutual focus on assimilation, or colorblindness, may produce positive attitudes but may lead, motivationally, to complacency with respect to the status quo, because people fail to attend to intergroup distinctiveness and potential disparity (Saguy et al., 2009).

Testing the effects on motivation directly, Scheepers, Saguy, Dovidio, and Gaertner (2014) manipulated the preferred acculturation ideology (either assimilation or multiculturalism) of Dutch participants and the expressed endorsement of a one-group or dual-identity perspective of these participants’ Moroccan interaction partner (a confederate). We measured Dutch participants’ explicit ratings of the interaction and of the interaction partner, as well as their cardiovascular responses during the interaction. Our psychophysiological index of motivational orientation was based on the biopsychosocial model (Blascovich, 2008). In brief, the model proposes that challenge, which is marked by relatively high cardiac performance coupled with low vascular resistance, represents an efficient mobilization of energy. People experience challenge when they believe their resources exceed task demands, behaviorally resulting in positive engagement. By contrast, threat, which is marked by relatively low cardiac performance and high vascular resistance represents a negative appraisal and, motivationally, is often associated with avoidance or escape from the situation.

As predicted, participants’ attitudes toward their partner were more favorable when the partner expressed a corresponding than a noncorresponding ideology, regardless of whether it emphasized common group identity and colorblindness or a dual identity and multiculturalism. However, the cardiovascular response, representing the different motivational orientations, differed as a function of the corresponding preference and ideology. As illustrated in Figure 4, while correspondence around assimilation did tend to alleviate threat associated with the default noncorresponding preferences (high status majority for one group and low status minority for dual identity), correspondence in multicultural perspectives aroused a stronger cardiovascular challenge response than did correspondence around assimilation. Thus, although they have the same immediate positive
These findings are consistent with the benefits of emphasizing multiculturalism for intergroup interaction. Learning about the benefits of multiculturalism improves majority-group members’ attitudes toward the outgroup (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000) and promotes more constructive behaviors during intergroup interactions. As noted earlier, Vorauer et al. (2009) found that when majority- and minority-group members studied the advantages of multiculturalism before interacting with each other, they displayed more positive other-directed behavior during their interaction than when they studied the advantages of obscuring intergroup differences.

We further examined the behavioral implications of the differences in motivation of majority-group members as a function of emphasizing that American values represent common identity or dual identity (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013, Experiment 2). As we noted earlier, people are particularly sensitive to violations of procedural justice within their own group relative to unfairness across group lines (Blader & Tyler, 2003). With respect to racial majority-group members, emphasizing dual identity representations—the importance of different racial and ethnic groups within a common national identity—can facilitate not only greater recognition of bias than does a common ingroup identity (which de-emphasizes subgroup identities and obscures subgroup disparities) but also produce greater motivation to act on behalf of low-status group members.

In this experiment, White participants first read a newspaper excerpt that emphasized common American identity or a dual identity, which emphasized the value of recognizing both common American identity and separate racial identities, or, in the control condition, did not read a newspaper article. Participants then were
presented with a blatant-discrimination hiring situation and indicated the extent to which they perceived discrimination and their willingness to protest the decision not to hire the Black applicant.

As expected, because of the blatant nature of the bias, participants reported similarly high levels of perceived discrimination across group-identity conditions. However, as depicted in Figure 5, emphasizing a dual identity, which acknowledges race in a socially inclusive way, facilitated reported willingness to protest the decision not to hire the Black applicant, compared to the common-identity and control conditions. Thus, whereas common identity when solely emphasized may create a hollow and potentially unstable form of harmony, a truly inclusive form of recategorization—a dual identity that recognizes and values different subgroup identities as an integrated element of a common ingroup identity—can promote positive attitudes and the positive intentions to achieve truly equitable and stable relations among both disadvantaged-group and advantaged-group members.

**Empirical Summary and Policy Implications**

In this section, we summarize the main themes and findings of the empirical work reviewed in this article, identify specific implications for policy, and offer recommendations for formulating and implementing policy as a function of the dynamics of intergroup relations to be addressed.

**Main Themes and Findings**

Despite the dramatic decreases in overt racism, ethnocentrism, and sexism over time and the current increasing visibility of women and people of color in
national leadership roles, subtle bias continues to exist and dramatically influences the achievements and well-being of members of these traditionally disadvantaged groups. Although it is expressed in indirect ways without antipathy, the consequences of contemporary bias are similar to those of old-fashioned racism and sexism: the restriction of economic, educational, and social opportunities for members of traditionally disadvantaged groups and women. Understanding the nature of subtle bias and the automatic processes that may underlie it can help illuminate how seemingly well-meaning interventions can obscure its effects, creating a veneer of tolerance while deflecting attention away from unfair treatment (and thus undermining motivation for action toward equality) among members of both dominant and disadvantaged groups.

Previous work on the common ingroup identity model reveals the impressive power of “we.” Conceiving of others in terms of common-group identity, rather than separate-group identities, harnesses the forces of ingroup favoritism and redirects them to produce more positive thoughts and feelings toward others in ways that have immediate impact for reducing intergroup bias.

In this article, however, we further considered a potential “darker side of we.” Creating a strong common ingroup identity can produce reductions in prejudice and promote intergroup harmony that may meet the immediate needs of members of majority and minority groups for being liked and respected, but may not translate to sustained efforts to challenge the status quo to create structural social change. Thinking of members of disadvantaged groups only in terms of common identity can distract attention away from group-based inequities, undermining motivations of members of the advantaged group to benefit the disadvantaged group collectively.

Moreover, the findings we have reported suggest that experiences of positive, commonality-focused contact can affect the way disadvantaged-group members view social inequality and their own disadvantage. These perceptions, which reflect an overly optimistic view of intergroup relations, can reduce motivation to challenge existing social inequality. In addition, because of reduced salience of subgroup identities, members of low status groups may experience immediate benefits of being able to “pass.” Appearing less identified with the minority group increases their personal chances of success because they are less likely to be the target of discrimination (Kaiser & Pratt-Hyatt, 2009). However, attempts to distance oneself from the minority group community in order to be included in the superordinate group sacrifices the psychological buffering effects of subgroup identity and social support by members of the subgroup. National policies that emphasize assimilation, under the expressed goal to eliminate bias, also communicate the devaluing of minority groups’ distinctive identities and beliefs. For instance, because of its commitment to not distinguishing groups based on race or religion, French law bans wearing conspicuous religious symbols, including headscarves, turbans, or veils in schools, as well as full veils (niqab) in public.
Nevertheless, it is possible to achieve mutual recognition both group differences and commonality, as reflected in a dual identity representation of the common ingroup identity model and consistent with principles of multiculturalism. While recognizing both difference and commonality may be less comfortable and arouse more intergroup tensions than emphasizing only common identity, colorblindness, and assimilation—particularly for majority-group members—respecting difference within the context of common connection may entail social and material benefits for both majority- and minority-group members. People show greater integrative complexity (Antonio et al., 2004) and display greater creativity in diverse than homogeneous groups (Crisp & Turner, 2011), and when diversity is acknowledged and respected people are more open and motivated to learn from each other (Migacheva, Tropp, & Crocker, 2011; see also Hahn, Nunes, Park, & Judd, 2014). Endorsement of a dual identity and the adoption of a multicultural perspective can thus motivate members of majority groups to perceive the value of the distinctive potential contributions of members of different group and communicate the respect that minority-group members seek in their intergroup interactions in ways that promote understanding and acceptance of diversity for common advantage.

Whether a country adopts a general policy of colorblindness (e.g., as France does constitutionally) or multiculturalism (e.g., as Canada does) is determined by historical influences as well as contemporary politics. The policies of the United States have traditionally emphasized colorblindness (e.g., the melting pot metaphor) more than multiculturalism (the tossed salad metaphor, in which each ingredient maintains its distinctive flavor). However, as a consequence of the Civil Rights Movement, in the 1960s the United States introduced significant color-conscious policies, such as affirmative action, that recognized and adjusted for historical bias against members of particular groups in order to achieve social equality. Recent rulings by the US Supreme Court (e.g., Fisher v. University of Texas; Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1), though, have limited the extent to which race or ethnicity can be considered in policies related to affirmative action, educational opportunity, and school integration.

Whether colorblind policies (e.g., assimilation) or color-conscious policies (e.g., multiculturalism) should predominate has been hotly debated based on moral and ideological grounds. By contrast, psychological research, including work on common and dual identity reviewed in this article, offers scientific evidence that can help shape the adoption of appropriate and effective policies to address unfair inequality. Many of the issues involving inequality are complex, for example in discerning the historical and immediate causes and in identifying the solutions. Therefore, in terms of colorblind versus multicultural policy, one size does not fit all. We propose that the policy pursued should be based on at least two factors (1) the nature of current relations between group, and (2) the desired state of those relationships.
Interventions and policies that successfully achieve a sense of common ingroup identity, even only temporarily, by suppressing recognition of previous group memberships can be an important step to achieving reconciliation between groups with histories of conflict. For example, the constitution of Rwanda that was adopted after the 1994 genocide prohibits political organizations based on “race, ethnic group, tribe, clan, region, sex, religion or any other division which may give rise to discrimination.” Recategorization in terms of a stressing a common ingroup identity can also promote intergroup forgiveness and trust between other groups divided by historical atrocities. Increasing the salience of “human identity” among Jewish Canadian students, in contrast to their “Jewish identity,” increased their perceptions of similarity with Germans, willingness to forgive Germans for the Holocaust, and interest in associating with contemporary German students (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005).

Although it is difficult to achieve a sense of common identity when groups are currently involved in conflict, this may occur in limited contexts. Kelman (2005), for example, described the activities and outcomes of a program of workshops for Israeli and Palestinian leaders designed to improve intergroup relations and to contribute to peace in the Middle East. These workshops attempted to create a sense of commonality by emphasizing common fate in terms of the existential interdependence of the groups: The long-term fates of Israeli-Jews and Palestinians in the Middle East are inexorably intertwined. Because of the history of conflict and distrust in these relations, third-party intervention may be needed to facilitate the recognition of commonality between members of the different groups (Harth & Shnabel, 2015), even in such circumscribed contexts.

We suggest that policies that emphasize common connections, such as the workshops described by Kelman (2005), are a critical first step because they help prevent and may reverse the escalation of competition and conflict. For instance, in intense or prolonged conflicts, group members often perceive themselves as victims of the injustices of the other group (Kelman, 2008). This sense of victimhood becomes integral in their conflict-related identity as they engage in “competitive victimhood.” Competitive victimhood reflects a motivation to establish that members of one’s own group have suffered greater injustice at the hands of the other group than the members of the other group have endured at the hands of your group (Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012). Competitive victimhood generates further conflict because it promotes retaliation and inhibits the kinds of processes, such as forgiveness, that permit reconciliation.

However, within this context of competitive victimhood it is possible to identify points of commonality between the groups. For example, Shnabel, Halabi, and Noor (2013) induced Israeli Jews and Palestinians to perceive of themselves as common victims (Study 1) or common perpetrators (Study 2) in their intergroup
conflict. Both of these forms of common identity reduced competitive victimhood and increased forgiveness of the other group.

In the case of groups in conflict, an immediate goal may be to alleviate tensions and facilitate forgiveness, which may be a shared goal that is best achieved through a policy or intervention promoting a common ingroup identity. However, the dynamics of separate groups in conflict are likely different than those between groups experiencing tension but situated interdependently within the same society. Groups within the same society generally recognize a legitimate superordinate identity (e.g., national identity) and strive for status and standing, often competitively, within that society. In countries with strong egalitarian principles members of minority groups expect to be treated equitably, whereas members of the majority group, who occupy an advantaged social position, are often motivated to maintain their own group’s status (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Understanding the different goals of the groups in a particular context is thus critical for designing appropriate policies to improve intergroup relations.

Policy and the Goals of Intergroup Relations

Although the strategy of emphasizing common ingroup identity may help to stabilize relations between groups in conflict, we argue that such an approach will be less effective for achieving stable and equitable relations between groups co-existing long-term within the same society. To improve intergroup relations under these conditions, policies must accommodate the goals and needs of members of majority and minority groups—preferably simultaneously.

According to the functional perspective, which was derived from the common ingroup identity model and reviewed earlier, groups prefer and adopt as a standard the representation that most effectively promotes their group’s goals (Dovidio et al., 2009). Majority groups generally prefer a one-group representation because it deflects attention away from disparities between groups and reduces subgroup identification, thereby reducing the likelihood of collective action that challenges the status quo (Wright & Lubensky, 2009). In addition, the standards and norms promoted within a colorblind ideology, which is often achieved by emphasizing common identity, typically represent those of the majority, and thus favor qualities that are more representative of majority-group than of minority-group members (Wenzel et al., 2007). Subtle biases in the qualities normatively valued within the common ingroup identity can thus give systematic advantage to majority-group members under the guise of meritocracy. One example of policy that facilitates colorblindness by emphasizing a single common identity involves limiting the use of languages other than the dominant language (e.g., English in the United States) in schools or in formal government transactions.

By contrast, minority groups prefer a dual identity, valuing their historical identities (e.g., ethnic heritage) or contemporary identities (e.g., as an
African-American), as well as the shared identity with the majority group. Feeling respected is a critical element of stable, positive intergroup relations, particularly among members of racial or ethnic minority groups (Bergsieker et al., 2010; Shnabel, Nadler, Canetti-Nisim, & Ullrich, 2008). Because colorblind policies that exclusively emphasize common identity fail to recognize or demonstrate respect for a valued aspect of the identity of minority-group members, efforts to induce a common identity while abandoning subgroup identities (e.g., to achieve colorblindness) are often met with resistance that can increase bias between members of the original groups (see Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004, for a review). This resistance is particularly strong among people who value their original group highly (Crisp, Walsh, & Hewstone, 2006) and when the initiative to form a superordinate identity is perceived to come from an outgroup rather than an ingroup member (Gómez et al., 2008; see also Nadler & Halabi, 2006).

Although not sufficient by itself to achieve equality, acknowledgment by individuals in positions of power of unfair practices in relations with minority groups can be an important step for addressing injustice while establishing intergroup trust with members of the minority group. As also discussed by Kahn and Martin (this volume), the shooting of Trayvon Martin in 2013 and the deaths of two unarmed Black men, Michael Brown in Missouri and Eric Garner in New York City, caused by police officers in 2014 generated significant racial unrest nationwide. Rather than denying racial bias in policing, FBI Director James Comey acknowledged that racism exists among police officers, as it does in the public generally, and that “[w]e need to come to grips with the fact that this behavior complicates the relationship between the police and communities they serve” (http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/12/politics/police-race-relations-james-comey/).

In addition, apologies, such as the one offered by Kevin Rudd, the Prime Minister of Australia, to the aboriginal people of Australia, can promote positive and productive intergroup relations within the society (Wohl, Horsey, & Philpot, 2011). Prime Minister Rudd’s apology acknowledged the injustices indigenous Australians have endured while reaffirming common identity. He apologized “for the pain, suffering, and hurt” experienced by generations and for the “laws and policies . . . that have inflicted profound grief, suffering, and loss on these our fellow Australians” (http://www.aboriginal.gov.au/about-australia/our-country/our-people/apology-to-australians-indigenous-peoples). This statement confirmed the acceptance of dual identity while conveying respect and sincere regret for the distinctive unfair experience of indigenous Australians as a group.

In general, then, interventions that are consonant with the preferences of each group—colorblindness for majority-group members and multiculturalism for minority-group members—are primarily effective for eliciting positive responses toward the other group (Dovidio, Gaertner, Niemann, & Snider, 2001). In addition, consistent with the functional perspective, majority-group members are more supportive of multicultural policies that acknowledge different identities when the
policies emphasize that their group identity is recognized and valued as an element of multiculturalism (Plaut, Garnett, Buffardi, & Sanchez-Burks, 2011). However, there may be variation across cultural contexts regarding which representation is optimal for reducing intergroup bias among minority and majority groups (Guerra et al., 2010). In particular, whereas many countries (e.g., the United States, Canada) have had long histories as immigrant-receiving nations, other countries (e.g., Germany) have traditionally had very restrictive immigration policies. In Portugal, for example, immigration of significant numbers of African people did not begin until relatively recently, 1974, and African Portuguese people tend to experience feelings of vulnerability that lead them to de-emphasize public recognition of their different traditions and culture (Guerra et al., 2010). Under conditions such as these, minority-group members may prefer a one-group representation, because it reduces their sense of vulnerability. By contrast, under such conditions, majority-group members may prefer a dual identity in which the different group memberships remain identifiable, because it mitigates threat to the distinctiveness and status of their own social identity (see Gaertner, Riek, Mania, & Dovidio, 2007). Indeed, Guerra et al. (2010) found, consistent with a functional perspective, that in this national context a stronger sense of having a dual identity produced more positive intergroup attitudes for members of the European Portuguese majority group, while having a stronger sense of a single, common-group identity elicited more favorable intergroup attitudes among members of the African Portuguese minority group.

As illustrated by these findings, the challenge in creating appropriate policies to improve intergroup relations is that intergroup relations are complex and dynamic. The meaning of “improving intergroup relations” varies as a function of the nature of the group relations and the goals of people who may still identify with different groups. When groups are in conflict or intergroup relations are characterized by tension, achieving group harmony through colorblindness that emphasizes common identity may be an important immediate goal and effective strategy for beginning to improve intergroup relations. When relations become more stable, members of minority groups may be less concerned about systematic exclusion and become more focused on achieving the promised inclusion in society, being treated fairly, and being respected for what makes them different as well as what they have in common with the majority group. From this perspective, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s goal to have his children not “judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character” was an insightful and strategic one in the midst of the intense racial conflicts of the 1960s. However, in the current racial climate, in which overt bigotry is much less common but the promise of full racial equality remains unfulfilled, adopting a multicultural perspective in race relations, which recognizes both components of a dual identity, may be a more desirable, appropriate and effective goal in intergroup relations. Because achieving fairness and equity within a society is critical for maintaining constructive, coop-
erative, and stable relations for the public good, multicultural policies, which we have shown may motivate both minority- and majority-group members to pursue structural changes, may be more beneficial than colorblindness. Color-conscious policies, such as affirmative action in hiring or considering diversity as one factor among many in college admissions and employment contexts, not only help address historical injustice and disadvantage experienced by some minority groups but also create more stimulating and representative environments in business and education.

Conclusion

In conclusion, colorblindness, assimilation, and multiculturalism have been the topics of enduring debate internationally. These debates have been fueled recently in part because of unprecedented immigration and refugee migration. While these issues involve philosophical and political principles, they are also fundamentally psychological issues. One of the future challenges for policy is to shift the rhetoric from one of fixed ideology (e.g., about principles of individual merit) to responsive efforts that recognize the dynamic nature of intergroup relations, group-based disparities, and ultimate goals, and are adjusted to best address contemporary challenges. In terms of policy, whether colorblindness or multiculturalism, one size does not fit all. The psychology of intergroup relations and social identity provides key insights into the dynamics that determine the appropriateness and effectiveness of these policies.

References


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